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Abstract 
This project wishes to explain why people perform acts which would 
normally go against their own morals. The project will examine the “Bad 
Barrel” theory by Dr. Philip Zimbardo in relation to the Abu Ghraib Prison 
scandal. The theory will be extracted from Dr. Zimbardo’s own book called 
“The Lucifer Effect” and there will be an account of the 6 days of the 
“Stanford Prison Experiment”, on which the theory is based. To relate it to 
Abu Ghraib and the abuses, there will be a profile of the most important 
people. Finally there will be made use of the article “Contesting the “Nature” 
of Conformity” by Haslam and Reicher, to question and criticize the theory 
of Dr. Zimbardo.  
The project will conclude that the “Bad Barrel” theory is a stepping stone 
towards explaining why people turn towards malignant behavior, but there 
are other factors to be taken into account. 
Introduction 
During the course of life, as most of us shuffle about in quiet dignified 
anonymity, we are endlessly confronted by tragedy upon tragedy that we 
humans inflict upon one another. However every time we are confronted 
with such affronts, be they war crimes, abuses of power or just plain 
violence, we always comfort ourselves with the fact that the kind of people 
who commit such heinous acts are clearly deranged or suffer from some 
form of mental disorder and that we ourselves would never stoop to such 
brutal and unacceptable behavior. 
But maybe that is not exactly the way it works. Maybe evil isn’t born but 
created, shaped by external forces to such a degree that even good, normal 
2 
 
and sensible human beings can be corrupted and influenced to such a 
degree that acts of malignancy no longer seem wrong and that the cruel and 
heartless suddenly seems plausible and right. 
There are many different theories dealing with the issue of evil and one of 
the most prevalent and commonly known theories is that of Zimbardo, who 
is known as an expert on the subject of evil. But many questions spring to 
mind when one considers the acts of cruelty committed by the few against 
the inaction of the many. 
In chapter 1, which explains Dr. Philip Zimbardo and his “Stanford Prison 
Experiment”, there will be an account for the 6 days the experiment lasted 
and an account for the theory Zimbardo extracted from it. Chapter 2 
profiles the Abu Ghraib prison and of the most important people involved in 
the abuses. It will also include chosen pictures of the abuse, which were 
leaked to the press in 2004.  
Chapter 3 compares the cases of the “Stanford Prison Experiment” and the 
Abu Ghraib scandal, and gives an account of the differences and similarities. 
Finally there is a comparison and discussion of Dr. Zimbardo’s “Bad Barrel”-
theory and the theory of Dr. Haslam and Dr. Reicher, with use of their 
article “Contesting the “Nature” of Conformity.” 
Finally it will be concluded, that the theory of Zimbardo, which is based on 
the idea of the environment and conditions being the main reason to moral 
decay, does not explain why people turn towards cruel behavior and there 
are other factors to be taken into account. 
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Problem Formulation 
How does Philip Zimbardo’s theory of the Bad Barrel hold up in a different 
setting, specifically when looking at the Abu Ghraib prison scandal, and can 
the theory be accepted as gospel or are there other factors to take into 
account? 
Research questions 
What happened during the Stanford Prison Experiment? 
What does the theory that Zimbardo developed on the basis of the 
experiment entail? 
What transpired at Abu Ghraib and how can it relate to Zimbardo’s 
experiment? 
How is the Zimbardo theory applicable to Abu Ghraib and what other 
theoretical explanations for what happened might there be?  
Reflections on Project Technique and Method  
Case choice 
We have chosen to look at the cases of the Stanford Prison Experiment and 
the abuses at Abu Ghraib. These two cases seemed us to have strikingly 
many similarities and the similarities produced a curiosity for whether or 
not a comparison of the two would shed more light on what actually 
happened during the experiment at Stanford, and how the events there 
might lead to an understanding of what went wrong at the prison of Abu 
Ghraib. 
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Literature on the Stanford Prison Experiment, by Zimbardo himself, was 
used to give the necessary insight to the thoughts behind the experiment, 
the conditions under which the participants acted and the events that 
unfolded. Chapter 1 of our project, where the experiment is described in 
detail, is written as to be close to the description Dr. Zimbardo makes in The 
Lucifer Effect. This was chosen to give a detailed look into the experiment 
and the reasoning behind the conclusions that Zimbardo arrives at. 
The experiment itself and the conclusions drawn from it were applied to the 
case of Abu Ghraib, in order to try and give a psychological explanation for 
the deeds done there. Another point of view is introduced in the essay 
Contesting the “Nature” of Conformity. This essay is used to contest 
Zimbardo’s Bad Barrel theory and to bring another perspective to his 
experiment. In order to give as truthful a description of the events as 
possible, and the motives instigating it, we have found it necessary to 
acquire more than just the one point of view; therefore including not only 
Zimbardo’s own theories and findings but also contesting opinions and 
experiments.  
To produce an understanding of the conditions in, and the decisions made 
at, Abu Ghraib the documentary film and book both titled Standard 
Operating Procedure, the book Fixing Hell and Dr. Zimbardo’s conclusions, 
derived from the Stanford Prison Experiment, have been analyzed and 
compared. We chose to use these materials to give the project a varied 
picture of what, how and why things happened as they did. We used 
Zimbardo’s conclusions, the book Fixing Hell and the article Contesting the 
“Nature” of Conformity in order to discuss the validity of the theories used 
in the respective sources. 
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Evolution of the Project 
The project started as a project about the banality of evil with a focus on 
how groups could corrupt individuals to reject their own moral guidelines 
in exchange for those of the group. As our work on the project continued we 
found it more interesting to look at how external stress-inducing stimuli 
could make an entire group of otherwise well-adjusted people turn evil. We 
then decided that it would be the purpose of this project to use Zimbardo’s 
theory, derived from his previous work with the Stanford Prison 
Experiment, on the case of Abu Ghraib and use this theory to explain the 
prisoner abuses that were common at the facility. We then moved on to 
wanting to use Zimbardo’s Bad Barrel theory to explain a situation where 
people resisted similar external influences, did not succumb to the pressure 
of the group and were able to fight back and have a positive influence on the 
situation, in other words a good case. On this note we looked into the 
Sophie Scholl-case1 from WWII, where a group of people tried to defy the 
regime, and also at the genocide in Rwanda, which is why we watched the 
film Hotel Rwanda2 as it portrays a group of people not succumbing to the 
evil of their situation. This so called good chapter was continuously pushed 
back and we finally decided to not include this part, even though it would 
have been interesting to bring into the discussion, in order to focus more on 
the discussion between the different theories concerning what induces this 
aberrant behavior. The primary reasons for this decision were the pressing 
deadline and that we were not able to find a fitting good case. We decided 
that our discussion would now be focused more on a comparison between 
different theories concerning evil and use them to explain the reasoning of 
                                                          
1 “Sophie Scholl” 2005, DVD, AtlanticFilm, Stockholm, Sweden. Directed by Marc Rothemund. 
2 “Hotel Rwanda” 2004, Blu-Ray, MGM Home Entertainment, Beverly Hills, California. Directed by Terry 
George. 
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the people involved in the cruel behavior towards detainees at Abu Ghraib. 
To give a more nuanced discussion, Contesting the “Nature” of Conformity 
was brought in to give us yet another perspective on the catalyst for the 
corruption of a group’s morals.  
Use of Supervisor  
The use of the supervisor has been vitally important to our work on this 
project. It has been a great help to us to have him follow up on our ideas 
and suggestions and continuously comment on them, thus polishing, 
helping, guiding and showing us the way back on track if it seemed 
necessary. We have repeatedly, during our work on the project, sent bits of 
the report for him to read and criticize as he saw fit. He has been quick to 
reply and give constructive feedback, often within a day, which has been of 
great importance since this has allowed us to proceed rapidly. Our 
supervisor has also been able to give us a nudge and get us going with the 
writing process.    
Evolution of the Groups Working Methods 
In the beginning of the project we did a lot of information seeking over a 
broad spectrum all to do with the topic of evil. As our information-gathering 
bore fruit and we began to narrow it down to something that might be a 
basis for a project. For a significant period of time after having decided 
upon our focus, we found that we had some serious trouble getting started 
with the writing process and continuously fuddled around trying to come 
up with a perfect outline, almost expecting to have a perfect project before 
we had even started. When we finally got started, it was not by our own 
initiative, but rather thanks to the efforts of our supervisor who spurred us 
on by setting a deadline for handing over a first draft if the first two 
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chapters. As soon as we got started writing we quickly distributed the work 
among us and continued to work in groups of two and three. We continued 
this form of work, meeting up after a weekend of intense writing, to get 
started on putting our two chapters together. When we reached a point 
where we felt secure enough in the contents of these two chapters we once 
again united and began to collectively write a discussion and comparison 
between the cases studied in the two chapters. As this comparison was 
written we started to divide the work amongst ourselves and once more 
split up into teams of two and three to deal with the formalities required in 
an academic project.  
What we would do differently 
If presented with a chance to work together again we will try to be more 
organized during the early days of the project work. We would also like to 
have begun the writing process earlier than we did and thus be finished 
with sections of the project earlier, and maybe avoid the long days of 
writing that we had to endure in order to get the project in the direction we 
wanted it to go. We would also have decided on some minor formalities, for 
instance how to make references. 
Also we would have liked to discover some of our source material earlier, as 
it has come to be a vital part of the project, and because of the late 
discovery we might not feel as well acquainted with the material as would 
have been preferable. We are aware, though, that it will probably always be 
the case with some sources because as you get on with the project, and the 
process, it becomes more evident what is needed in order to argue a better 
case. You simply know your project better further in the process and thus 
become more able to pinpoint relevant literature. For example we have 
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now found an article by S. H. Lovibond, Mithiran and W. G. Adams3 where 
they build on the theories proposed by Zimbardo, in much the same way as 
Haslam and Reicher, and examine the possible changes in the social 
organization of a prison and the effects hereof.  
Dimensions 
Science and Philosophy 
There are many theories as to what makes a person commit evil. Some 
argue that there has to be some predisposition for corruption of a person’s 
morals to occur, while others tend to say that it is not the person but the 
situation that is liable to create evil. While this project might take a mainly 
psychological approach to discussing these differences of opinion, the data 
that the opinions are based on are still unclear and inconclusive to a point 
where rendering any attempt to claim one viewpoint truer than the other 
purely speculative. This places our problem firmly within the field of 
philosophy. Furthermore this project is dealing with a very important 
ethical question, in the sense that we discuss how the morals of an 
individual changes and whether or not the blame lies with the individual or 
the situation.  
 
Subjectivity and Learning 
In our project we are looking into how individuals react and might alter 
their personalities when becoming a part of a group. Groups tend to form 
their own set of social rules, norms and views. The project also delves into 
how, and indeed if, people can be influenced not only by the group but also 
                                                          
3 Lovibond, S H & Mithiran & Adams, W G 1979 “The Effects of Three Experimental Prison 
Environments on the Behaviuor of Non-Convict Volunteer Subjects” Australian Psychologist Vol. 14 
No. 3, University of New South Wales 
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by external factors and thus be driven towards cruel or malignant acts if 
placed in a suitable environment. Also discussed in this project is the 
possibility of being driven towards a decay of personal morals by having it 
justified and thus be coerced to do acts of evil. Since the processes involved 
are actively changing a person’s views on acts such as physical abuse and 
degradation of ones fellow man, this falls under the dimension of 
Subjectivity and Learning. 
Chapter 1: The Stanford Prison Experiment 
The premise of the Stanford Prison Experiment was simple enough. Take 
some perfectly healthy, young, normal and mentally stable people with no 
previous prison experience and randomly assign them roles as either 
guards or prisoners and place them in a prison setting, with few directives 
on how to behave and only a few vague rules to follow and see if these 
young people change their behavior according to the roles and settings or if 
they act like the intelligent and perfectly normal people they are. In short: 
to see whether it takes a cruel person to be cruel. During the course of the 
experiment all the participants changed more than anyone anticipated, to 
such a degree that even the professor in charge of the experiment, Dr. Philip 
Zimbardo, who played the dual roles of prison superintendent and chief 
researcher of the experiment, was completely sucked in by the setting, so 
much that he became blind to what quickly turned into severe abuses and 
the systematic breakdown of the prisoners’ identities. 
But how could the situation deteriorate so quickly? How could these people 
transform into the roles they had been assigned in such short time? To try 
to explain this sudden change and the quick surfacing of aberrant and 
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violent behavior one must look closely into the process that these people 
were exposed to and the events that led to the sudden escalation of cruelty 
that surfaced in the Stanford Prison Experiment. Here follows a description 
of what happened during the days of this experiment. The primary source 
for this chapter is Zimbardo’s The Lucifer Effect. 
Day 1 
On the first day of the experiment the people who had been assigned the 
role of prisoners were, without warning, picked up and taken through the 
booking process by real police officers in a real police station and then 
brought to a basement at Stanford University. This place had been modified 
with iron barred doors, a place for solitary confinement, The Hole, which 
consisted of a large closet. The entire facility was outfitted with surveillance 
equipment, so that the researchers could follow what happened. 
The guards were waiting for the prisoners who upon arriving were 
blindfolded, stripped of their personal effects and clothes, forced to stand 
with their hands against the walls with their legs spread and to hold this 
uncomfortable position, while the guards packed away their personal 
belongings. After this they were sprayed with white powder that was, 
according to the guards, a form of delousing powder. Then they were given 
a smock, a pair of rubber clogs and part of a stocking to cover their hair, 
instead of the traditional head shave that is often a part of the protocol in 
standard prisons. 
After this, the prisoners had their blindfolds removed and were subjected to 
the first show of power by the guards, who quickly asserted their position 
as the ruling cadre in this unfamiliar setting by carrying a billy club, 
wearing uniforms and reflecting sunglasses. One of the guards, Arnett, 
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started reciting the rules that the guards and researchers had agreed on at a 
staff meeting they had held the day before. The rules were as follows: 
“1. Prisoners must remain silent during rest periods, after lights out, during 
meals, and whenever they are outside the prison yard. 
2. Prisoners must eat at mealtimes and only at mealtimes. 
3. Prisoners must participate in all prison activities. 
4. Prisoners must keep their cell clean at all times. Beds must be made and 
personal effects must be neat and orderly. Floors must be spotless. 
5. Prisoners must not move, tamper with, deface, or damage walls, ceilings, 
windows, doors, or any prison property. 
6. Prisoners must never operate cell lighting. 
7. Prisoners must address each other by number only. 
8. Prisoners must always address the guards as “Mr. Correctional Officer” 
and the Warden as “Mr. Chief Correctional Officer.” 
9. Prisoners must never refer to their condition as an “experiment” or 
“simulation.” They are imprisoned until paroled. 
10. Prisoners will be allowed 5 minutes in the lavatory. No prisoner will be 
allowed to return to the lavatory within 1 hour after a scheduled lavatory 
period. Lavatory visitations are controlled by the guards. 
11. Smoking is a privilege. Smoking will be allowed after meals or at the 
discretion of the guard. Prisoners must never smoke in the cells. Abuse of 
the smoking privilege will result in permanent revocation of the smoking 
privilege. 
12. Mail is a privilege. All mail flowing in and out of the prison will be 
inspected and censored. 
13. Visitors are a privilege. Prisoners who are allowed a visitor must meet 
him or her at the door to The Yard. The visit will be supervised by a guard, 
and the guard may terminate the visit at his discretion. 
14. All prisoners in each cell will stand whenever the warden, the prison 
superintendent, or any other visitors arrive on the premises. Prisoners will 
wait on orders to be seated or to resume activities. 
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15. Prisoners must obey all orders issued by guards at all times. A guard’s 
order supersedes any written order. A warden’s order supersedes both the 
guard’s orders and the written rules. Orders of the superintendent of the 
prison are supreme. 
16. Prisoners must report all rule violations to the guards. […] 
17. Failure to obey any of the above rules may result in punishment.”4 
During this recitation Arnett continuously reminds the prisoners that they 
will do well to learn the rules, which they will regularly be quizzed on and 
are expected to know by heart.  
On the prisoner smocks an arbitrary 3-4 digit number has been sewn on the 
front. This number is the prisoners’ identity and will take the place of their 
name for the duration of their stay. Following the plan that was agreed 
upon at the staff meeting the day before, the guards make the prisoners say 
their numbers out loud. This serves the dual purpose of familiarizing the 
prisoners with their numbers and also helps the guards quickly assert their 
dominance over the newly imprisoned young men. The prisoners are then 
shown to their randomly assigned cells and get some time to acquaint 
themselves with their surroundings. 
After some time the night shift guards take over and the day shift leaves the 
premises. They serve dinner at 7 PM but since The Yard, the area right 
outside the individual cells, is rather small and the table only has room for 6 
of the 9 prisoners, the guards determine that six prisoners will be allowed 
to eat first and, when they’re done, the remaining three can come and “eat 
what is left”5. One of the prisoners finds this to be unacceptable and 
suggests a nonviolent protest but fail to rally the other prisoners to his 
cause and in the end he too joins the meal.  
                                                          
4 Zimbardo, P G “The Lucifer Effect” Ch. 3 P. 44 L. 4 – P. 45 L. 3 
5 Zimbardo, P G “The Lucifer Effect” Ch. 3 P. 48 L. 5 
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After eating, the prisoners are taken back to their cells where, as stated 
earlier in the rules, they are to refrain from talking. However prisoner 819 
and 8612 disobey and talk joyfully and laugh heartily. This breach of the 
rules goes unpunished. 
After a short period of inactivity one of the guards, Hellmann, initiates 
another count and tells the prisoners that until they do it flawlessly, they 
will not get to go to bed. Even though the prisoners perform admirably, 
Hellmann, now joined by another guard called Landry, make them do it 
again and again in ever more difficult and imaginative ways, all the while 
initiating punishments for imagined faults in their execution of said counts. 
It quickly becomes apparent that Hellmann and Landry are having a power 
struggle where they constantly try to one-up each other with continuously 
more creative counts and punishments which, for now, are limited to 
physical exercise, much as it would be in an army boot camp. Some of the 
prisoners catch on to this and begin snickering and laughing at this 
somewhat childish power struggle, but the guards quickly identify and 
punish these shows of frivolity with even more physical exercises. 
Especially 819 gets singled out and punished because he is not taking it 
very serious. Hellmann then somewhat revolutionizes the count by forcing 
the prisoners to sing their numbers and, even though this exercise is 
obviously silly and a little funny, the guards make it clear that there is 
nothing funny about it and once again punish those who disagree with more 
physical workouts. 
The remaining guards enter The Yard, including Burdan who had to step in 
because of a last minute cancelation. 
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The guards shift from having the prisoners recite their number from 1 to 9 
in the order they are lined up, to making them recite their prisoner ID 
numbers. Burdan quickly assumes the role of being a guard and takes it a 
step further by being more physical, pulling prisoners out of the line and 
having them do solos. 
When prisoner 8612 denies having enjoyed the counts, when asked by the 
guard Hellmann, he is placed in The Hole all the while shouting freedom 
slogans.  
Day 2 
The day starts at 6 AM. When all the prisoners are out their cells guard 
Ceros starts out by physically adjusting the prisoners’ sloppy posture. 
Before breakfast is served, the prisoners have to have a lesson on the rules 
and do the morning’s exercise. Guard Vandy starts the lesson and quickly 
Ceros is in a scrutinizing mood, walking past the prisoners again and again 
playing with his billy club and making threatening gestures, bashing the 
club in his palm, whilst yelling at the prisoners when they are too slow at 
repeating the rules. At one point prisoner 819 laughs at the situation and 
the guard suggests that “Maybe we’ll have something special for 819.”6 
Despite of this warning 819 continues to attract focus by quitting the 
exercise and refuses to continue, making the rest of the prisoners stop until 
he re-enters. Eventually he plays along as not to cause trouble for his fellow 
inmates. But his disobedience has already earned him a seat in The Hole.  
After having placed 819 in The Hole the guards carry on. Varnish decides to 
display his dominance over the prisoners, by telling them what to think.  
                                                          
6 Zimbardo, P G “The Lucifer Effect” Ch. 4 P. 57 L. 22  
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“[…] 4325, what kind of day is this?” 
“It’s a good day, Mr. Correctional Officer—” 
“No. It’s a wonderful day!” 
“Yes sir, Mr. Correctional Officer.” 
They begin to chant, “It’s a wonderful day, Mr. Correctional Officer.” 
“4325, what kind of day is it?” 
“It’s a good day.” 
Vandy: “Wrong. It’s a wonderful day!” 
“Yes sir. It’s a wonderful day.”7 
After this, Vandy sends the prisoners to their cells to tidy up and prepare it 
for the inspection three minutes later. 
Still tired from the night and frustrated with the guards, the prisoners have 
their cells inspected. The guards are not content with what the prisoners 
have achieved. Having expressed his malcontent with 8612’s bed, Vandy 
grabs sheets and blankets and throws them to the ground. Obviously 
angered by Vandy’s action, 8612 leaps at him. Vandy fights him off, strikes 
him in the chest, even though physical violence is prohibited, and calls out 
to the other guards for help. The guards get a hold of 8612 and throw him in 
The Hole without much concern for his wellbeing.  
In The Hole the two disobedient prisoners, 819 and 8612, start to plan a 
revolt but since the toilet schedule is so tight, and both of them need to go, 
they decide to postpone the revolt. While they sit in The Hole the rest of the 
prisoners are served breakfast. This is in no way going according to the 
rules as the prisoners are sitting on the floor and not obeying the rule of 
keeping quiet during meal-time. The prisoners are discussing a hunger 
strike in solidarity with their comrades in The Hole, which the guards do 
not approve of. At the same time they figure that they should demand to get 
                                                          
7
 Zimbardo, P G “The Lucifer Effect” Ch. 4 P. 58 L. 18 – L. 27 
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some of their things back e.g. spectacles, medication and books. When 
breakfast is over with, prisoners 5486 and 7258 continue this disorderly 
behavior by not complying with the guards’ orders to return to their cells, 
forcing the guards having to push them into the cells, but as The Hole is 
already filled with rebellious prisoners, this punishment is not an option. 
Prisoners in cell 3 volunteer to do the dishes but, despite their best 
intentions, this sentiment goes against their fellow prisoners’ plan of 
rebellion. 
The guards, thinking this eagerness to create a prisoner uprising must come 
from a lack of strictness in their behavior, instate a morning work period, 
today consisting of scrubbing the walls and floors. Another aspect of the 
higher level of strictness is that the guards grab all the blankets in both cell 
2 and 3, go outside and drag them through the bushes, so that small burrs 
or stickers, as the guards insist on calling it, get stuck, before handing them 
back to the prisoners. They now have to pull out these pointy seedpods if 
they don’t want to get stung when using them. This senseless work gets to 
prisoner 5704, who starts yelling about how stupid it is and refuses to do 
any of it. Being addicted to cigarettes, he now thinks that refusing to do as 
he is told might not be wise if he wants to smoke, so after this little fit he 
starts picking the stickers from the blanket. This is the point of these kinds 
of chores. It is a way for the guards to show the prisoners who is in charge 
of this circus and who makes the calls. The guards didn’t find anything 
wrong with these mindless chores, on the contrary, they wanted to punish 
the rebellious prisoners. The last thing to happen during the morning shift 
is that a group of three prisoners tries to win some power by ripping their 
numbers off and complaining about the conditions under which they are 
held captive. To control them, the guards rush in and strip them naked. 
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They remain naked as long as the numbers are off. But an uprising is under 
way. 
As the day shift arrives and goes on duty, the rebellion is on. The day shift 
keeps the morning shift on duty to help get this riot under control. The new 
head of the rebellion, prisoner 5704, convince his cell mates to barricade 
themselves in their cell using the beds to block the only door, covering it 
with their blankets. Because they cannot get into cell 1 the guards turn to 
cell 2. They rush in and handcuff prisoners 8612, 819 and 1037 in their cell, 
while removing their beds to The Yard. The prisoners struggle and 819 
screams: “No, no, no! This is an experiment! Leave me alone! Shit, let go of 
me, fucker! You’re not going to take our fucking beds!”8 Arnett says that they 
can get back their things when cell 1 stops rebelling. Confused, 8612 utters 
that they don’t take away prisoners’ clothes and beds in real prisons to 
which another prisoner states that they actually do. This is somewhat 
surprising, since none of the participants has previous experience with 
regular prisons.  
8612 signals that he wants to get his stuff back. Ceros choose to show his 
refusal by bashing the bars with his club, almost hitting 8612’s fingers. As 
the guards move towards cell 3, 8612 and 1037 warn the prisoners in the 
cell and tell them to barricade themselves as cell 1 did. 1037 even 
encourages violent resistance. Trying to cool down cell 2, Landry grabs a 
fire extinguisher and fires it into the cell, yelling at them to get away from 
the door and calm down. The prisoners from cell 2 feel as if they got 
stabbed in the back when they see the beds from cell 3 being yanked out, as 
one from the cell yells “What kind of solidarity is that? Was it the ‘sergeant’? 
‘Sergeant’ (2093), if it was your fault, that’s all right because we all 
                                                          
8
 Zimbardo, P G “The Lucifer Effect” Ch. 4 P. 61 L. 11 – L. 12 
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understand that you’re impossible.”9 “Sarge” will also prove to be the most 
obedient of all the prisoners. Seeing that the nine prisoners could be a 
handful to a usual three guard shift, Arnett starts on the divide-and-conquer 
tactic that will prove useful for the guards throughout the experiment. Cell 
3 will from now on be used as the cell for the “good” prisoners. The guards 
tell the good prisoners to make the others “straighten up” but 8612 will 
have none of that and backs up cell 1 in their revolt. 8612 ends in The Hole 
and after refusing to leave the cell, 1037 is shackled then dragged to The 
Yard. To calm the situation the guards start a count and strangely all of the 
prisoners perform the count though 8612 is mocking it from his position in 
The Hole. 
Some of the prisoners are already beginning to feel the effect of the lack of 
sleep during this night. During the day both 5704 and 3401 have naps and 
wake up thinking a lot of time has passed despite it only having been a 
short while. This is a consequence of being deprived of sleep. 
Because of the rebellion, lunch is served only to the prisoners of cell 3 but, 
in solidarity with their fellow inmates, they refuse to eat it. When the work 
period is on they once again submit to the will of the guards and pick 
stickers from their blankets. At the same time, in the still barricaded cell 1, 
the prisoners are starting an escape they have just planned. 5704, who 
plays guitar and therefore has strong fingernails, loosens the screws of the 
power outlet faceplate, which they reshape to unscrew the door lock. The 
plan is:  
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“One will pretend to be sick and, when the guard is taking him to the toilet, 
will open the main entrance door down the hall. Signaled by a whistle, the 
other cellmate will burst out. They will knock the guard down and run away 
to freedom!”10 
A creative plan indeed, but it is foiled by any form of planner’s worst 
nightmare: coincidence. On a routine round, Landry decides to turn the 
handle to cell 1. As it falls to the ground he yells out for help. Arnett and 
Markus run in and chain the prisoners together and again 8612 is sent to 
The Hole.  
Landry, imposing authority on the prisoners, makes the next count into a 
singing lesson. From now on, this is being used to demean the prisoners. He 
himself takes the role as the teacher.  
Because of the early descend into this volatile situation, the Prisoner 
Grievance Committee is formed with Dr. Zimbardo, who listens to their 
complaints e.g. about the guards, the food and wanting their books, glasses 
and medication, back. The doctor, acting in the role of superintendent, 
promises to take it up with the staff and has succeeded in pacifying the 
rebelling prisoners, for a while at least.  
At this time 8612 shows symptoms of not handling the stress and the 
dominance of the guards well. He is insisting on seeing Zimbardo, 
complaining that the contract has been violated, and that the guards are 
hassling him unnecessarily. Basically, he wants out of the experiment. Dr. 
Zimbardo says that he has imposed the guards’ rage on himself by behaving 
as he did. Zimbardo eventually convinces 8612 to stay a bit longer, but this 
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turns out to be more influential than he might have thought. As 8612 
returns to The Yard, he tells the other prisoners that they are trapped in 
this prison and can’t get out despite of what their contract might have said. 
Even though they can actually leave at any point they now have a feeling of 
being trapped in this prison, which makes the experience all the more 
intense. 
During the evening count, Hellman and the other night shift guards again 
feel the urge to show their power e.g. by pushing the prisoners down while 
they are doing pushups and taking away pillows. 8612 is again placed in 
The Hole. After having been in Zimbardo’s office earlier, complaining, and 
not seeing any improvement now gets to him. Even though he was one of 
the strong leaders of the revolution he is now at a breaking point. He is 
having a meltdown, throwing a fit, screaming, out of his mind about not 
being able to take it anymore and wanting out.  
“You’re messing up my head, man, my head! This is an experiment; that 
contract is not serfdom! You have no right to fuck with my head!” 11 
He threatens to do anything necessary to get out, even to slit his wrists! 
“I’ll do anything to get out! I’ll wreck your cameras, and I’ll hurt the guards!”12 
He is finally “set free” and picked up by his girlfriend.  
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Day 3 
During the night shift on the previous night, some guards have revoked the 
prisoners’ rights to toilet visits and have placed buckets in the cells for the 
prisoners to use when necessary. This has made The Yard smell like a toilet. 
Many prisoners complain amongst themselves that they can’t take the 
increasing harassment of the guards and that they are having trouble 
coping with the situation in general. Ever since 8612’s breakdown, dissent 
has been spreading among the prisoners and many are talking about not 
being able to last much longer and, as if this wasn’t enough, rumors have 
been spreading about a supposed breakout that is to be orchestrated by 
now released prisoner 8612 and some of his friends. Zimbardo himself has 
now been drawn in by the role of superintendent to such a degree that he is 
worrying more about the breakout than he is worrying about the poor 
sanitation and rising possibility of infections this lack of sanitation 
provides. 
Some of the guards, namely Burdan and Ceros, are becoming more 
aggressive and even more physical in their abuse of the prisoners and have 
been known to trip prisoners on their way to the bathroom, during which 
they are blindfolded, and pushing them into the urinals hanging on the wall, 
when in the bathroom. These two are also the guards primarily responsible 
for getting prisoners into The Hole. 
At 2.30 AM the guards issue yet another count, even though the prisoners 
have only had a couple of hours sleep and they are, obviously, unable to do 
the count properly, thereby giving the guards even more chances to punish 
the prisoners. After having done the count a couple of times, a guard called 
Varnish get the prisoners to recite the rules again and again while guards 
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Vandy, Ceros and Burdan search the cells for the keys to the handcuffs, 
which had mysteriously vanished. 
The rumors of a breakout orchestrated by former prisoner 8612 have been 
getting to Zimbardo and he has devoted most of his energy to come up with 
different ways to address the issue. After a failed attempt at getting 
permission to move the prisoners to the old county jail, Zimbardo decided 
that the best idea would be to move the prisoners to an upstairs storage 
room. He also feels that they need more accurate information and resolves 
to plant an informant, under the pretense of being a replacement for 8612. 
He chooses not to inform the guards about the informant. 
When he, David, arrives, the guards spare no time in showing him who is in 
charge and treat him just like the other prisoners. He quickly becomes 
irritated by the bathroom routine, but is advised against rebellious action 
by fellow prisoner 1037, who David quickly befriends and by whom he is 
told that: “the prisoners play along with the guards so that we can get them 
at their weak spot”.13 
While Zimbardo is busy trying to figure out what to do in case of a breakout, 
one of the other researchers has had to take over temporarily and meets 
with the Prisoner Grievance Committee. Chief among their complains are 
the unsanitary conditions of the prison and Curt listens but promises 
nothing, yet the committee seems happier having vented their complaints 
to some sort of authority figure. 
Later the prisoners get to have their first visits from family and friends. The 
visits are conducted one at a time and with a guard present within listening 
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range at all times. The prisoners are ordered not to speak about the guards’ 
punishments or be overtly honest about their conditions. 
Prior to the arrival of the visitors, the prisoners are told to clean their cells, 
The Hole-sign is taken down and the prison is sprayed with a perfumed 
disinfectant to counter any remaining stench from the previously removed 
shit-buckets. Then, for the first time during the experiment, the prisoners 
are served a large and quality meal. Meanwhile the visitors have arrived 
and are waiting somewhat impatiently to visit their recently incarcerated 
loved ones. While the visitors are waiting they are introduced to the rules 
and, when some of these rules don’t sit well with some of the visitors, they 
are told that their imprisoned relative should have informed them about 
these rules, even though the prisoners had at no point been asked to do so. 
After the visits are over and done with, Zimbardo initiates the 
aforementioned plan to foil 8612’s supposed plan to free his still 
incarcerated mates. They blindfold the prisoners and lead them up into the 
upstairs storage room. They then hastily dismantle the prison and, when 
they’re done, Zimbardo sits himself down on a chair in the middle of the 
room and gleefully awaits the arrival of the supposed mob that will try to 
spring the other prisoners free. 
After a substantial amount of waiting it dawns on Zimbardo that the rioters 
aren’t coming and that the whole thing has been nothing but a rumor. They 
rebuild the prison and lead the prisoners back down to their cells. 
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Day 4 
On day 4 a priest became a participant in the experiment. His presence had 
earlier been requested by the Prisoner Grievance Committee for the 
purpose of having a confidant. Having been a prison chaplain in an East 
Coast prison, he could provide some feedback on how realistic Zimbardo’s 
prison setting is and how authentic the prisoners’ reactions were to the 
environment. In addition, this pastoral visit had the added effect of making 
the entire setting seem even more real than it already did. 
The prisoners now had the opportunity to visit and talk to the chaplain and 
voice their feelings and complaints about their current situation. When 
introducing themselves to the priest, half of the prisoners introduced 
themselves by number and not by name. The priest started asking them 
questions, to which a real prisoner in a real prison would have no problem 
answering but to which these fake prisoners had no possibility of 
answering, such as if they had informed their family about the charges 
against them, whether or not anyone had posted bail for them and if they 
had sought legal counsel. During the meetings with the prisoners, the 
chaplain promised to contact the parents of one of the prisoners. When he 
ended his visit Zimbardo jokingly asked whether he would really follow 
through on his promise and the priest replied that: 
“Of course I am, I must. It is my duty.”14 
During his visit with the priest, 819 broke down in tears, and Zimbardo, 
advised by the priest, decided that it was best to pull him out of the 
experiment. This idea was hindered by the intervention of the guards, who 
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had deemed it fitting to give 819 a proper send-off by making the other 
prisoners repeatedly chant: 
“Prisoner 819 did a bad thing.”15  
Followed by:  
“Because of what Prisoner 819 did, my cell is a mess.”16 
This distresses 819 so much that he initially states that he has to go back 
and Zimbardo has to thoroughly convince him that it is just an experiment 
but in the end manages to convince him, once more, to leave the 
experiment. 
During this day, the informant that Zimbardo had placed among the 
prisoners finds the situation so disgusting, that he tries to instill a form of 
spirit of resistance among his fellow inmates, the same inmates that he had 
been put there to spy on.   
Later that same day a new prisoner is introduced to the prison to replenish 
the somewhat diluted number of prisoners. He gets the number 416 and 
will become a nuisance to the guards. This prisoner will not experience the 
escalation of the prisoner abuse, but is subjected to it right from the start. 
Just as the other prisoners, he is stripped naked and “deloused” but more 
thoroughly than the others were at the start of the experiment. 
Not long after, some trouble breaks out as 1037 screams that he has a 
weapon, a needle. The guards are handling it with a cool attitude, two of 
them smacking their clubs on the cell door and guard Landry spraying the 
cell with one of the fire extinguishers. They poke at the prisoners through 
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the prison bars with their clubs but end up losing one of the clubs to the 
prisoners. A new short rebellion breaks out due to the prisoners’ mocking 
of the guards. Even though they get the situation under control, lunch is 
taken away from all prisoners including 416, who didn’t partake in the 
rebellion on this, his first day. 
In the afternoon a cameraman from KRON, a local TV-station, comes to the 
prison again, but Dr. Zimbardo restricts his filming, only allowing him 
access behind the observation covers and limits the interviews to only the 
warden and Zimbardo himself, excusing his decision with the fact that he 
didn’t want too much intervention in the experiment.  
Later in the evening, the night shift comes in but just before leaving, Arnett 
of the day shift spits out one final remark: 
“I’ve had enough of this, go back to your cage. Clean up your cells so when 
visitors come, they won’t be nauseated by the sight of it.”17 
At dinner, 416 decides to go on a hunger strike. As 416 refuses to eat his 
dinner, Hellman explained that refusing to eat is a violation of the rules and 
that he will be punished for his disobedience. His punishment for not 
wanting to eat is time in The Hole and not only did he have to spend time in 
The Hole, he had to take the dinner with him during his punishment. 
Afterwards, he has to sit and stare at his food but continues the hunger 
strike despite being yelled at by Hellmann: 
“You don’t want to eat two stinking sausages? You want me to take those 
sausages and cram them up your ass? Is that what you want? Do you want me 
to take that and cram that up your ass?”18 
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Because he, in this quiet way, rebels against the authority of the guards, he 
poses a threat to their position of power. To counter this threat, Hellmann 
engages in the divide-and-conquer strategy once more by threatening to 
take away visiting rights for all of the prisoners, not only 416. The guards 
use the other prisoners to punish 416. They force 7258 to try and convince 
416 to quit the hunger strike but without any effect, therefore sending him 
to The Hole, but not before 416 tries to remind people that it is all an 
experiment and that the guards are violating the contract, signed by every 
participant upon entering the experiment, to which Burdan reacts: 
“‘I don’t give a damn about any contract!’ Burdan yells. ‘You’re in here 
because you deserve it, 416. That’s how you got in here in the first place, you 
broke the law. This ain’t no nursery school. I still don’t understand why you 
don’t eat those damn sausages. Did you expect this to be a nursery school, 
416? Do you expect to go around breaking the law and wind up in a nursery 
school?’”19 
In The Hole, 416 can now hear the other prisoners banging on the door, 
strongly encouraged by the guards, and “thanking” him for getting them in 
trouble and getting their visitation rights taken away. This is not going to 
happen though, as Dr. Zimbardo makes sure that this right that cannot be 
denied. 
After the visits, the guards have time to spend with the prisoners. They 
make up some activities. Hellmann takes control and tells prisoner 7258 to 
play Frankenstein and the prisoner called Sarge to play the bride of 
Frankenstein, making them get so close that their bodies touch, still only 
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wearing the prison smocks and no underwear, and making 7258 tell Sarge 
that he loves him. Hellmann keeps hassling the prisoners and at one point 
he makes the prisoners play leap frog. The prisoners have to jump over 
their cellmates, while their smocks are too short for this and creep up as 
they play the game. Later on, Hellmann dictates that only Sarge and 5704 
should play on. As they play he remarks: 
“That’s the way dogs do it, isn’t it? Isn’t that the way dogs do it? He’s all ready, 
ain’t he, standing behind you, doggy style? Why don’t you make like a dog?”20 
At the end of the day 416 is sitting in The Hole again. The guards make a 
small activity out of this situation as they call a vote on whether or not he 
should spend the night in The Hole or be let out now. If he is to be let out 
the other prisoners will have to give up their blankets. The result of the vote 
ends in favor of the prisoners keeping their blankets and leaving 416 in The 
Hole overnight. 
Day 5 
At 2.30 AM Thursday the prisoners are woken for a count. At 7 AM the 
prisoners are subjected to yet another count, but prisoner 5704 has had 
enough. He refuses to submit to the guards’ punishment and when the 
guards initiate their divide-and-conquer tactics, he is indifferent to the plight 
of his fellow prisoners. After some time the guards get enough of his 
insubordination and when he is about to be put in The Hole, guard Ceros 
grabs him and pushes him against the wall. This evolves into a short 
wrestling match, during which 5704 hurts his foot. He wants to see a doctor 
but the guards ignore his requests and put him in The Hole. He is left there 
until breakfast and when he is let out he tries to hit Ceros. 
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When the morning shift takes over they continue to punish 5704 by 
chaining him to the bed. Arnett makes the other prisoners do 70 push-ups 
as punishment for 5704’s attack on a guard. After the punishment, Arnett 
makes the prisoners sing “Oh What a Beautiful Morning”, “Amazing Grace” 
and “Row, Row, Row Your Boat” but during these exercises 5704 continues 
his verbal insubordination and is, once again, placed in solitary confinement 
where he kicks down the partition between the two parts of The Hole. In 
response to this, the guards pull him out of The Hole, chain his ankles 
together, handcuff him and drag him into cell 2. He escapes and is dragged 
back into The Hole once more to await a disciplinary hearing by the parole 
board. 
To the fury of the guards, prisoner 416 continues his hunger strike. 
1037 was in such a bad shape that Zimbardo himself notes that he “[…] 
displayed symptoms of extreme stress to such an extent that I had him taken 
to the quiet room outside the prison yard and told him that it would be best if 
he were paroled at this time.”21 
When 1037 was picked up by his parents another prisoner began to crack. 
Prisoner 4325 broke down when 1037 was released and had to be released 
as well.  
The last chance of the day to use the lavatory is at 10 PM. Christina, 
Zimbardo’s love interest and a social psychologist, is present and briefly 
watches the events but is appalled by what she is witness to. The situation 
ends with Zimbardo and her having a heated discussion during which 
Zimbardo realizes that the experiment has gone well beyond the 
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boundaries of the morally defensible and thus he resolves to terminate it 
the following day. 
The Bad Barrel theory   
As Dr. Zimbardo processed his experiences with the Stanford Prison 
Experiment he could arrive at a conclusion. He had these perfectly normal 
students, who did not differ from each other in any remarkable way, even 
though most of those chosen as guards acted awful towards the prisoners. 
He sought to explain the transformation of these normal young men by 
looking at the circumstances under which they had to perform. He found 
that we, in western society, have become too obsessed with the individual’s 
opportunity to make enlightened choices, infused with moral.  
“We want to believe in the essential, unchanging goodness of people, in their 
power to resist external pressures, in their rational appraisal and then 
rejection of situational temptations. We invest human nature with God-like 
qualities, with moral and rational faculties that make us both just and wise. 
We simplify the complexity of human experience by erecting a seemingly 
impermeable boundary between Good and Evil. On one side are Us, Our Kin, 
and Our Kind; on the other side of that line we cast Them, Their Different Kin, 
and Other Kind. Paradoxically, by creating this myth of our invulnerability to 
situational forces, we set ourselves up for a fall by not being sufficiently 
vigilant to situational forces.”22 
He is of the persuasion that we need to change the focus when looking at 
evil actions from looking at the internal dynamics of the people involved to 
the whole situation around the “incidents” and those involved. The 
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circumstances, according to Zimbardo, are in most cases the determining 
factor that turns good people bad.  
“Therefore, whenever we are trying to understand the cause of any puzzling, 
unusual behavior, our own or that of others, we should start out with a 
situational analysis. We should yield to dispositional analyses (genes, 
personality traits, personal pathologies, and so on) only when the 
situationally based detective work fails to make sense of the puzzle. My 
colleague Lee Ross adds that such an approach invites us to practice 
“attributional charity.” That means we start not by blaming the actor for the 
deed but rather, being charitable, we first investigate the scene for situational 
determinants of the act.”23 
He foremost blames bad situations for horrible incidents unfolding.  
Increasing the rate of environmental deterioration, factors such as 
dehumanization and anonymity are some of the things to take notice of 
when studying, and trying to avoid, situations where different types of 
inhumane behavior occurred. The dehumanization makes it easier for 
people to treat others worse than they normally would. Since it could be 
hard to hurt another fellow human being, seeing them as lesser beings 
removes most of the doubt, whether or not one might be able to maltreat 
others. Anonymity helps in the way that it makes people more willing to do 
things that they might not do under normal circumstances. Without the fear 
of being recognized, many of the repercussions of the acts they are about to 
commit disappear. A study conducted using children has shown that this is 
highly plausible. The study showed that the children were more likely to 
                                                          
23
 Zimbardo, P G “The Lucifer Effect” Ch. 10 P. 212 L. 10 – L. 17 
32 
 
play “aggressive” games when they were dressed up in costumes that hid 
their identity.  
Another of his conclusions of the experiment is that a bad system can help a 
bad situation escalate into mayhem because of the lack of guidelines to lean 
on. Vague guidelines seem to be fatal when going into a potentially bad 
situation. In the Stanford Prison Experiment Zimbardo saw this in the 
behavior of the guards who found continuously more creative ways and 
excuses to punish the prisoners. 
“Our guards could justify most of the harm they did to the prisoners by 
referencing “the Rules.” Recall, for example, the agony the prisoners had to 
endure to memorize the set of seventeen arbitrary rules that the guards and 
the warden had invented. Consider also the misuse of Rule 2 about eating at 
mealtimes to punish Clay-416 for refusing to eat his filthy sausages.”24 
This is an example of how loopholes in the system can be exploited by those 
creative enough. If these loopholes are not closed and sanctions are not 
enforced towards those exploiting them, they will continue to take 
advantage of the situation. In the case of the Stanford Prison Experiment 
they also became more creative with their interpretation of the rules. There 
was no consequence of their actions and that led them to believe that it was 
acceptable behavior. It goes to show that if bad behavior is not “punished” it 
can evolve to become the norm and even, as in Stanford, escalate out of 
control to a point where no one questions the moral righteousness of their 
actions. 
If bad actions go unchecked, it creates a platform for bad actions to thrive.  
In the Stanford Prison Experiment it is seen in some of the guards who do 
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not, to as high a degree, actively partake in the humiliation of the prisoners. 
They seem not to like the situation and the degrading of the prisoners 
happening but chose not to do anything to stop it. By not preventing evil 
around the world, people in general allow evil to exist and sometimes even 
flourish. 
“We must learn that passively to accept an unjust system is to 
cooperate with that system, and thereby to become a participant in 
its evil.” – Martin Luther King, Jr.25 
Chapter 2: Abu Ghraib 
The sources for this chapter are Col. James’ Fixing Hell, Errol Morris’ book 
and film Standard Operating Procedure and press kit thereof, the website 
GlobalSecurity.org and Antonio M. Taguba’s Article 15-6 Investigation Of The 
800th Military Police Brigade. 
Introduction to the Abu Ghraib prison 
The Abu Ghraib prison took its name from the neighboring city of Abu 
Ghraib. The word ‘Abu’ is Arabic for ‘father’ while ‘Ghraib’ means ‘strange’, 
and so Abu Ghraib could be loosely translated to house of strange fathers. It 
was built in the 1950’s by the British and then served the purpose of an 
insane asylum. During the Saddam Hussein regime it was used as a 
maximum-security prison where murderers and rapists, the hardcore 
criminals, were incarcerated. It was considered a living hell, where torture 
and executions were carried out on a daily basis. It is said to have housed 
up to 15.000 prisoners at one point, many of them Iraqi dissidents but also 
Kurds who happened to “disappear” during the Iraq-Iran war of the early 
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1980’s. There are conflicting numbers due to the lack of recordkeeping, but 
as many as 20.000 prisoners may have been executed during Saddam’s rule, 
most of them buried on the prison grounds or incinerated. 
Soon after securing re-election by 100% of the vote, Saddam Hussein chose 
to grant amnesty to almost every incarcerated Iraqi citizen on Sunday, 
October 20th, 2002 - including those at the Abu Ghraib prison. Once there 
were no prisoners, there was no longer any need for guards to patrol the 
perimeters of the encampment, and so in the wake of the releases, chaos 
soon erupted and the buildings of the Abu Ghraib facility were left in even 
worse conditions than the former inmates had lived under during their 
stay.  
The Abu Ghraib prison compound occupied 280 acres (about 1.1 KM2) of 
space, located inside the Sunni Triangle, 32 kilometers west of Baghdad. 
During the American occupation of Iraq, the city of Fallujah became a 
hotspot for the Iraqi insurgency, and with Abu Ghraib sitting comfortably in 
between Baghdad and Fallujah, getting to and from the compound became a 
potentially life-threatening journey as transports traveling those particular 
roads were frequently subjected to ambushes and bombings. 
“We seen a sign saying ‘Fallujah’—right there, next town over— and we’re 
like, ‘Yo, we’re right in the heart of it now,’ ” Sergeant Javal Davis said. 
“Downtown Baghdad is right to the back wall. Al Ramadi, the other hot-spot 
town, is right up to the west of us, not too far. We’re right in the heart of the 
insurgency.”26  
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By the time the American forces took over the facility, the prison had been 
vandalized and looted of everything of value, every floor tile had been 
rooted up, wiring had been ripped from the walls and many of the buildings 
had been subjected to arson and were in need of serious repair. In the 
interim between the abandonment by the Iraqis and the takeover by 
American forces, the prison grounds were used as a city trash dump. The 
average yearly temperature in Baghdad is about 30 degrees Celsius; during 
the summer months the temperature can reach as high as 40 degrees 
Celsius. Apart from the watchtowers along the outer perimeter and a few 
buildings scattered around the encampment, the vast portion of the waste-
filled grounds were left exposed to the scorching sun. Many of the 
interviewed military personnel, who had been stationed there at one point 
or another, comment on the stench of Abu Ghraib. When the officers who 
were to later oversee the Abu Ghraib operation first arrived, they noted that 
wild dogs were found roaming the grounds, searching for food that might 
be scattered among the litter and waste, digging up old bones from the 
mass graves of Abu Ghraib’s horrible past.  
“It was very, very hot. The heat index in direct sunlight was 130 (degrees 
Fahrenheit, about 54 degrees Celsius) and the odor was… I will never forget 
the smell of Abu Ghraib. The smell of sweat and trash and feces and urine 
waifing through the air, it just… I will never forget the smell of Abu Ghraib.” – 
Israel Rivera, U.S Army Reserves27  
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During the American occupation of Iraq, Abu Ghraib consisted of Camps 
Ganci and Vigilant, LSA’s (Life Support Area) for the military personnel, an 
area for processing new prisoners, The CPA Prison (CPA, Coalition 
Provisional Authority) which hosts the now infamous hard site and Tiers 
1A and 1B of Abu Ghraib, the ECP (Entry Control Point – the only 
entrance/exit at Abu Ghraib) and a TOC (Tactical Operations Center) for the 
320th MP Battalion.  
Every important area that served a specific task on the lot was enclosed by 
large blocks of concrete set next to each other, forming walls, serving as 
protection for the detainees and military personnel but at the same time 
also having rectangular, triple-strand concertina-wire wrapped around 
them to make it harder for detainees to escape. The enclosures were 
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constructed appropriately far apart so that the MPs (military police) could 
patrol the prison camp. The MPs were also stationed in 24 guard towers 
that stood along outer perimeter walls of the compound. 
Camp Ganci and Camp Vigilant were enclosed camps on the Abu Ghraib 
prison compound with cellblocks consisting of tents protected by concrete 
pillars and stacked sandbags to protect the detainees from incoming mortar 
attacks. Camp Ganci was the larger of the two camps with a prisoner 
capacity of 4.800. Ganci was used for detaining civilians suspected of 
committing civilian crimes, much to the function of a regular jail. Vigilant, a 
much smaller tented encampment, could hold up to 600 detainees and was 
only to house those of “genuine military concern”.  The detainees deemed to 
have the slightest amount of value to the military intelligence officers were 
moved to Tier 1A/B of the hard site, while Tier 2A/B held detainees 
suspected of civilian crimes that could not function properly among other 
detainees, most notably the mentally ill. 
The operations of the Abu Ghraib prison were set up so that the MPs were 
responsible for housing, managing and protecting the prisoners who would 
then be handed over to the MI (military intelligence) for interrogations. The 
personnel immediately responsible for the Abu Ghraib prison were 
Brigadier General Janis Karpinski of the 800th Military Police Brigade, who 
also oversaw 15 other prisons administrated by the U.S Forces during 
Operation Iraqi Freedom and the highest-ranking officer to later face 
consequences because of the events at Abu Ghraib; Colonel Thomas Pappas 
of the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade who was the highest-ranking 
officer on-site most of the time and Major David DiNenna of the 320th 
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Military Police Battalion who ran MP operations out of the tactical 
operations center.  
October 2003 saw the arrival of the 372nd MP Company, which was a unit in 
the 800th MP Brigade that would later become highly involved in the prison 
scandal.  The conditions the 372nd found when they arrived were very 
unsatisfactory compared to regular army standards. The Life Support Area 
was supposed to be a slice of home away from home, where soldiers could 
enjoy some of the modern conveniences they were used to: Internet cafés, 
satellite TV, phones, a gym and even fast-food restaurants. Such was not at 
all the case at Abu Ghraib, where even the basic modern commodities like 
running hot water or a functioning field kitchen were nowhere to be found. 
Instead, the soldiers showered in wooden booths with drums of cold water 
tucked overhead, while breakfast, lunch and dinner came out of combat 
ration packets, so called MREs – meals ready to eat. Women could not 
purchase feminine hygiene items and even though sex and sexual 
exploitation were common, condoms were not available. The conditions of 
the LSA combined with the fact that insurgency mortar attacks struck 
somewhere on the vast compound every single night for the duration of the 
occupation. If a guard patrolling the compound could see a van pull up with 
an Iraqi male jumping out and preparing a mortar strike, the soldier was 
not allowed to immediately engage this threat with deadly force, he first 
had to call the “ops shop”, the operations base in Baghdad to receive 
permission to engage, while hoping that the attacker during this time, had 
not already fired off a shell in his direction. This type of environment would 
over time wear you down and as a result morale was understandably 
subpar. The detainees also lacked basic, humane conditions. No one, neither 
US forces or detainees, wanted to be there. 
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“The encampment they were in when we saw it at first looked like one of those 
Hitler things almost,” Davis said. “They’re there, in their little jumpsuits, 
outside in the mud. Their restrooms was running over. It was just disgusting. 
You didn’t want to touch anything. Whatever the worst thing that comes to 
your mind, that was it—the place you would never, ever, ever, ever send your 
worst enemy.”29 
“Within my first five steps after disembarking from the helicopter, the smell of 
raw sewage overwhelmed my senses and nearly made me retch. This was a 
barren wasteland interrupted only by garbage and filth. My God. I’ve never 
seen anything like this. I can’t believe our people have to work in this.”30  
Joe Darby, Specialist with the 372nd MP Company, was the whistleblower on 
the abusive treatment that occurred at the Abu Ghraib prison between 
October and December 2003. 
Darby had been on home leave during the first weeks of November. Upon 
his return to Abu Ghraib, he heard of a particularly brutal incident, 
involving a detainee getting wounded by gunfire on November 24th 2003, 
when he was not present on site, and found out that Corporal Charles 
Graner, who was assigned to the night shift on Tier 1A, had taken 
photographs of what happened. Out of interest he asked to see them, and 
was given 2 full CDs consisting of photographs taken by several of the 372nd 
MP guards. He found parts of the content disturbing. After a period of 
considering how to deal with the subject matter, he chose to hand in the 
CDs to special agent Tyler Pieron of the Criminal Investigation Command 
(CID). In a “60 Minutes”-interview with Anderson Cooper he explains his 
reasons for doing so:   
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“Ignorance is bliss they say, but to actually know what they were doing… You 
can’t stand by and let that happen. […] We are Americans. […] We hold 
ourselves to a higher standard; our soldiers hold themselves to a higher 
standard. […] They broke the law and they had to be punished. […] It’s that 
simple.”31 
CID reacted quickly, and on January 24th 2004 the Chief of Staff of US 
Central Command directed that the Lieutenant General David D. McKiernan 
conduct an investigation into the 800th MP Brigade’s detention and 
internment operations from November 1st 2003 till March 2004. McKiernan 
appointed Major General Antonio M. Taguba to head the investigation.  
On February 2nd 2004 Taguba and his investigation team, including army 
psychologist Harry Nelson, went to Abu Ghraib tasked with looking into the 
specific allegations of detainee abuse allegedly committed by the soldiers of 
the 372nd MP Company. Throughout the month of February, Taguba and his 
team took witness statements and gathered information on the running of 
the detention facilities in order to conclude whether or not the allegations 
were true. 
The following is an excerpt from Major General Taguba’s Article 15-6 
Investigation Of The 800th Military Police Brigade, henceforth titled the 
Taguba Report: 
“[…] between October and December 2003, at the Abu Ghraib Confinement 
Facility (BCCF), numerous incidents of sadistic, blatant, and wanton criminal 
abuses were inflicted on several detainees.”32 
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These were the findings Major General Taguba made during his 
investigation of the Abu Ghraib prison. He was asked to conduct this 
enquiry based on pictures leaked from the prison portraying detainees in 
degrading and abusive positions along with guards, soldiers of the US Army, 
posing in shocking ways. 
Events of the Abu Ghraib Prison – The Taguba Report 
To create an understanding of what happened at the Abu Ghraib prison, 
here follows an account of the most important events that happened:  
October 18, 2003: A prisoner is shackled to his bed with underwear on his 
head. Sabrina Harman snaps a photo. Why this detainee, called ‘Taxi Cab 
Driver’, was shackled in the first place is unclear. Nothing points toward 
this man having any relation to anything that could be of value to the 
Americans, he was simply at the wrong place at the wrong time. A point 
expressed explicit in the documentary from 2007‘Taxi to the Dark Side’.  
Picture no. 1, Annex 2 
October 24, 2003: Lynndie England is photographed holding a detainee 
named ‘Gus’, by the guards of Tier 1A, on a leash. ‘Gus’ is on the floor naked. 
Megan Ambuhl states the reason for putting a detainee on a leash like this:  
 
“It [the picture] made it look like we were just fooling around with a detainee 
for our own pleasure,” she said. “That wasn’t the case. That was an 
uncooperative detainee who needed to get out of that cell—a guy with sores 
and stuff. You’re not going to touch him. You get him out, and it may have 
been unorthodox, but he didn’t hurt anybody and he didn’t get hurt.”33  
Picture no. 2, Annex 2 
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October 25, 2003: The photograph shows several US soldiers standing 
casually around next to three naked and handcuffed detainees on the 
ground. Corporal Graner squats next to the pile, clearly interacting with the 
detainees. These detainees were alleged rapists suspected of having raped 
another detainee, only 15 years of age.  
Picture no. 3, Annex 2 
November 4-5, 2003: The detainee nicknamed ‘Gilligan’ is here placed on a 
box, wires are attached to his hands and around his throat to simulate a risk 
of electrocution if he moves e.g. lowers his arms or fall off the box. 
“[…] I tied a loop knot on the end, put it on, I believe, his index finger, and left 
it there.” Frederick said that Javal Davis and Harman came into the shower 
while he was doing this, and somebody then tied a wire to Gilligan’s other 
hand, and draped another below his throat.”34  
Picture no. 4, Annex 2 
November 7, 2003: The infamous ‘naked human pyramid’, which was very 
discussed in the media. Graner and England are here posing with the 
detainees Graner had ordered stripped and piled up. 
Picture no. 5, Annex 2 
“[…] then he told us that he was piling them in a pyramid. We’re like, ‘OK, 
why?’ He’s like, ‘To control them, so they’re all in one area.’ ” Of course, the 
prisoners were already entirely at Graner’s mercy, naked and hooded and 
unresisting, and he kept them in the pyramid—with the seventh man on top—
for less than ten minutes. As far as Sivits could tell the objective was 
humiliation […]”35 
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The 7th of November was a very eventful day at Tier 1A. The hooded 
prisoners, who were first piled up, were also forced to simulate fellatio and 
other degrading acts.  
“They [the pictures] were shot on Tier 1A, he focused on the images of “sexual 
stuff” from the night of the pyramid, and it occurred to him that what he was 
looking at was evidence of prisoner abuse.”36  
Picture no. 6, Annex 2 
November 24, 2003: A shootout with a Syrian detainee takes place because 
of rumors stating he, with the help of an Iraqi guard, has managed to get a 
hold of a pistol. The intelligence proves right as the detainee opens fire 
during the cell-search conducted in order to locate any hidden weapon.  
Picture no. 7, Annex 2 
December 12, 2003: Military working dogs were often used in the process 
of breaking down detainees. In this particular incident the dogs are used in 
order to intimidate the naked detainee, the situation escalates as the 
handling soldier loosens his grip on the leash just enough for the dog to be 
able to bite the detainee in the leg.  
Picture no. 8, Annex 2 
On March 9th 2004 the report was finished and submitted. Based on his 
findings during his time in Abu Ghraib, Taguba concluded that some 
soldiers of the 372nd MP Company abused detainees, with acts of physical 
violence, severe sexual humiliation and psychological torture.37  
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He assigns culpability and compiles a list of fixes that should be put in place. 
Here are some examples: 
Training  
Taguba concluded that none of the soldiers in the 800th MP Brigade had the 
proper training required to conduct the task of handling and preparing 
detainees for MI interrogations. In addition, they were never familiarized 
with the Geneva Convention, which specifically prohibits the kind of 
treatment that the detainees were exposed to in Abu Ghraib.    
Conditions 
Taguba assesses that the conditions are relevant, because it influenced the 
psychological wellbeing of the soldiers. He mentions for example the lack of 
dining facilities, a barbershop and a place for the soldiers to unwind. He 
also concludes that the fact that they were in constant danger, contributed 
to the extremely high stress-level of the soldiers.  
Culpability and Lack of Leadership 
Unsurprisingly, Taguba found that no one wanted to take responsibility for 
what happened to the detainees on Tier 1A. Several of the guards of 372nd 
MP Company blamed the Military Intelligence officers for instigating the 
abuses, because they were constantly commanding the MPs to perform 
tasks they did not have the necessary skills to do.  
Brigadier General Janis Karpinski who was in charge of all MP operations at 
Abu Ghraib, also blames the MI for what happened. Taguba on the other 
hand, puts a lot of blame on Karpinski because most witnesses stated that 
they never saw her on-site. He even goes to the extent of claiming, that if 
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she had paid attention to the administrative faults of her brigade, the abuse 
could have been prevented. 
“There is a general lack of knowledge, implementation, and emphasis of basic 
legal, regulatory, doctrinal, and command requirements within the 800th MP 
Brigade and its subordinate units.”38 
In his report, Taguba recommended a few changes that should have been in 
place from the beginning. These included changes in the preparation of the 
soldiers and making sure that they had a clear set of guidelines that every 
soldier, down to the lowest levels, understood. Furthermore, Taguba 
assessed that the Geneva Convention should be available for both detainees 
and guards. To make sure that the detainees also knew their rights, there 
would have to be a copy in their native tongue. 
Conclusively he recommended the following people to either be relieved of 
command or reprimanded:  
Brigadier General Janis Karpinski, Commander, 800th MP Brigade.  
Colonel Thomas M. Pappas, Commander, 250th MI Brigade.  
Lieutenant Colonel Jerry L. Phillabaum, Commander, 320th MP Battalion. 
Lieutenant Colonel Steven L. Jordan, Former Director, Joint Interrogation 
and 
Debriefing Center and Liaison Officer to 205th Military Intelligence Brigade. 
Major David W. DiNenna, 320th MP Battalion. 
Captain Donald J. Reese, Commander, 372nd MP Company 
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1. Lieutenant Lewis C. Raeder, Platoon Leader, 372nd MP Company 
Sergeant Major Marc Emerson, Operations SGM, 320th MP Battalion 
1. Sergeant Brian G. Lipinski, First Sergeant, 372nd MP Company 
Sergeant First Class Shannon K. Snider, Platoon Sergeant, 372nd MP 
Company39 
Apart for these mentioned operatives, we have profiled the most important 
actors in the abuse scandal. The following is a short outline of those people. 
Profiles of the people in Abu Ghraib 
Sabrina Harman 
Sabrina Harman, born January 5th 1978, was a Specialist with the 372nd MP 
Company stationed at the Abu Ghraib prison’s hard site. She was 
responsible for a lot of the photographs that were used as evidence in the 
indictments against her and other military personnel depicted in the 
infamous pictures from Tier 1A and 1B.  
Her comrades described Sabrina Harman as a very genteel, person not 
condoning violence in any way. Specialist Sivits of the same company said 
of Harman: 
“We’d try to kill a cricket because it kept us up all night in the tent. She would 
push us out of the way to get to this cricket, and would go running out of the 
tent with it. She could care less if she got sleep, as long as that cricket was 
safe.”40 
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Harman was also a good friend to the Iraqis of Al Hillah – she bought one 
family a refrigerator and for the Iraqi kids she would have balloons and 
American treats.  
Even though she did not approve of violence she was very interested in the 
marks that the use of violence would leave. Death fascinated her and she 
even visited the morgue in Al-Hillah and took photographs of the dead 
bodies: 
“She would not let you step on an ant,” Sergeant Javal Davis said. “But if it 
dies, she’d want to know how it died.”41 
Harman says herself that her first inclination whenever someone is injured 
is to take a photo of the injury. 
Harman was often to be found behind the camera documenting her days in 
Iraq. Photography had always been fascinating to her, and after serving her 
sentence for her participation in the events at Abu Ghraib she attempted a 
degree in the subject.  So snapping a photo here and there did not seem out 
of place to her:  
“’I guess we weren’t really thinking, Hey, this guy has family, or, Hey, this guy 
was just murdered,’ Harman said of those parting happy snaps. ‘It was just—
Hey, it’s a dead guy, it’d be cool to get a photo next to a dead person. I know it 
looks bad.’”42 
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At one point Harman herself writes in one of her letters to her wife Kelly:  
“I just don’t think it’s right and never have that’s why I take the pictures to 
prove the story I tell people.”43 
On March 20th 2004, the Army files charges against Sabrina Harman. She 
was prosecuted for participating in the events at Abu Ghraib of the fall of 
2003. On May 16th 2005 she is convicted of maltreatment, conspiracy to 
maltreat, and dereliction of duty. She is sentenced to 6 months in prison, a 
reduction of rank to private, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and a bad 
conduct discharge. 
Lynndie England 
Lynndie England was a private first class with the 372nd MP Company 
where she worked as an administrative clerk.  
One of the pictures circulated in the media was that of Lynndie England 
holding a leash, wrapped around the neck of the detainee “Gus” whilst he is 
lying on the floor, naked. To England this is no big deal. But she 
understands why the picture looks so disturbing when it appears on TV or 
in the newspaper, but to her it is not disturbing. It is merely a picture of her 
and not a picture of a naked prisoner being tortured. 
“I don’t see the infamous picture from the Iraq war. I just see me. It’s just a 
picture. The first thing that comes up In my mind is just that’s me and yeah – 
that happened at that prison when I was in Iraq, and that was one of the 
pictures taken.”44  
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And on the question of the detainee being sexually humiliated: 
“Just because Gus is naked? […] That’s standard operating procedure.”45 
On March 24th 2004 Lynndie England was prosecuted for participating in 
the events of the fall of 2003. On September 26th 2005 she was sentenced to 
3 years in prison, a reduction in rank to private, and a dishonorable 
discharge. 
Charles Graner 
Charles Graner, an ex-marine, was a Corporal with the 372nd MP. 
“My first impression of Graner was that he was an arrogant, loud, and 
obnoxious type person,” Sergeant Frederick said. That was back in Virginia, at 
Fort Lee. Graner was new to the unit. He was an ex-Marine, a Desert Storm 
vet, now a Pennsylvania corrections officer, a grown man with more spark in 
his eyes than most of the kids in the company. He made sure he was noticed, 
talking up his exploits with women, full of attitude, a gung-ho soldier, and at 
the same time a prankster (he liked to tell the one about how he spiked a 
rookie prison guard’s coffee with mace); he came on as a bit of a bad boy, not 
a misfit but a maverick, always ready to take a poke at pomp and hypocrisy, 
and he didn’t care who heard him.”46 
Because Graner was a former corrections officer, he came in with the 
mindset of that. But he did not find it to be of much use. 
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“Graner however found that his civilian training wasn’t of much use at Abu 
Ghraib. “I had come in with a correctional officer’s mind-set of care, custody, 
and control, and I’m going to do the least amount of work possible and get 
paid for it because that’s what corrections officers do,” he said. “And that 
lasted for about a day, and then I met Big Steve.” Big Steve was the CACI 
contract interrogator whom Javal Davis identified as one of his primary MI 
tutors on Tier 1A. His proper name was Steven Stefanowicz, he was a former 
petty officer in the Navy, and he had never conducted an interrogation before 
he arrived at Abu Ghraib in October with a six-figure salary.”47 
Though Graner was responsible for many of the photographs taken at Abu 
Ghraib, he initially did not like to do unpleasant things to the prisoners. 
Megan Ambuhl Graner says: 
“He didn’t want to see this guy [Prisoner nicknamed Santa] who was mental 
be harassed by other detainees. Same with Shitboy – we weren’t interested in 
seeing these people suffer.”48 
According to himself he merely took the pictures to make sure that he could 
prove what had happened at Abu Ghraib to others when he went home, 
because upon his return after the First Gulf War, he experienced to be 
disbelieved when seeking medical benefits for veterans. But as time went 
by, he started staging the prisoners for photos as had happened in the case 
of the picture of Lynndie England and the detainee “Gus”.  
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“Graner cradled one prisoner’s head in his left arm, drew back his right arm in 
a cocked fist, posed as if to strike, and asked Sivits to take a picture of him. It 
was obvious to everyone that Graner was staging the situation for the 
camera.”49 
On March 20th 2004 Graner is charged with assault, maltreatment, indecent 
acts and conspiracy to maltreat. He is finally convicted on January 16th 2005 
and sentenced to 10 years in prison, a reduction of rank to private, a 
dishonorable discharge and the forfeiture of all pay and allowances. 
England and Graner 
England and Graner first met each other on a drill weekend in Maryland in 
2001, where they were sent to get prepared for the stationing at Abu 
Ghraib. England did not immediately notice Graner, but he noticed her. He 
was used to female attention, and if he did not get it from the woman he had 
eyes on, he would make her give it to him. Lynndie England says:  
“He would draw the attention. If the attention is not on him, he’ll get it there. 
That’s what he does. He thrives on that. If you’re not paying attention to him, 
he’ll make comments about you. Whatever you want to hear, he’ll say it. […] 
He knew what to say, what to do, how to act. I finally suckered in around the 
end of February.”50 
Lynndie England initially did not wish to have a relationship with Graner, 
because she had a husband at home. But she gave in, filed for separation 
and told her husband that she wanted a divorce. 
On the last weekend of February 2003, the company was moved to Fort Lee. 
England and Graner were now around each other all the time. They talked 
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about getting married and having children. But people advised her to stop 
the relationship. 
“Everyone tried to tell me, he’s too old for you [England was 20, Garner was 
34], he’s a bad guy, I don’t think you should be messing around with him, […] 
But I didn’t believe them because I believed him.”51 
One weekend they both left Fort Lee to visit England’s parents, but her 
husband was in the house. England thought it would be too weird. Instead 
they drove to Graner’s hometown Unitown. When they came back to Fort 
Lee they were in love and ready to go to Iraq. 
According to Lynndie England many of the things she did during her stay in 
Abu Ghraib was due to her infatuation with Graner. Regarding the picture of 
the naked detainee “Gus” and herself holding him on a dog leash (captured 
on October 24th 2003), she says, it is not a picture of her relationship with 
“Gus”, because she had none. It is a picture of her relationship with Graner, 
who took the photo: 
“It’s showing that he has power over me, and he wanted to demonstrate that 
power […] Anything he asked, he knew that I would do it.”52 
Ivan Frederick 
Ivan “Chip” Frederick was a Staff Sergeant with the 372nd MP Company 
stationed at Abu Ghraib. Frederick was appointed the NCO 
(noncommissioned officer) in charge of the entire compound during the 
course of the night shift, therefore being the highest ranking officer present 
during the questionable events. 
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Frederick had been a correctional officer as a civilian back home in Virginia, 
and therefore had experience with the most common procedures in running 
a prison, but when he asked for a copy of the standard operating 
procedures of Abu Ghraib all he got was one page on the rules of 
engagement. 
“[…] Frederick asked for a copy of the prison’s standard operating procedure, 
all he got was the MPs’ one-page rules of engagement, which described the 
steps for escalating the use of force in a dangerous confrontation: shout, show, 
shove, shoot. ‘It had nothing to do with handling the detainees,’ he said.”53 
Along with Cpl. Charles Graner, Staff Sergeant Frederick became one of the 
leading figures in the events at Tier 1A. Even though Frederick outranked 
Graner, he was portrayed as a “relatively unassertive, more of a go-along-
and-get-along officer than a natural leader”.54 This created an off-balance in 
the power structure and allowed for Cpl. Graner to act more freely in his 
actions at the Tier. 
Frederick was highly involved in the abusive treatment of the some of the 
detainees at Tier 1A. For example, he was the one instigating the situation 
with the detainees called ‘Gilligan’, who was hooded, placed on a box and 
wired with fake wires. 
“[…] Frederick went to the shower and surveyed the scene [...] Gilligan was 
perched on his box. Frederick noticed some loose electrical wires hanging 
from the wall behind Gilligan. “I grabbed them and touched them together to 
make sure they weren’t live wires,” he said. ‘When I did that and got nothing, I 
tied a loop knot on the end, put it on, I believe, his index finger, and left it 
there.’”55 
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He explained this deviant behavior with this: 
“Frederick said he took Romero’s words “like an order, but not a specific 
order,” and he explained, ‘To me, Agent Romero was like an authority figure, 
and when he said he needed the detainee stressed out, I wanted to make sure 
the detainee was stressed out.’”56  
On March 20th, 2004 the Army filed charges against SSG Frederick and on 
October 20th of the same year he pleaded guilty to aggravated assault, 
maltreatment, conspiracy to maltreat, indecent acts, and dereliction of duty. 
He was sentenced to 8 years in prison, reduction in rank to private, 
forfeiture of all pay and allowances and a dishonorable discharge.  
Megan Ambuhl Graner 
Megan Ambuhl (now married to Charles Graner) was a specialist with the 
372nd MP Company that worked the night shift at Abu Ghraib. She was the 
best friend and roommate of Sabrina Harman, whom she regarded as her 
little sister.  
At Abu Ghraib, Megan was present at some of the events at Tier 1A that 
would later incriminate others, but did not wish to be in any of the pictures. 
She was only captured once in the same frame as a prisoner. “She just 
happened to be in the way […]”57 as Lynndie England puts it. 
She says herself that she did not like the pictures, because it does not show 
what really happened. 
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“[…] Your imagination can run wild when you just see blood, and you don’t 
have a story behind it. The pictures only show you the fraction of a second. 
You don’t see forward and you don’t see backward. You don’t see outside the 
frame.”58  
Though she did not wish to be in any pictures, she had no problem with 
what happened at Abu Ghraib: 
“Not when you take in to account that we’re being told that’s helping to save 
lives, and you see people coming in from right outside the wire with their body 
parts missing, and they need to know who’s doing it so they can stop it – and 
these are your battle buddies.”59  
On March 20th 2004 Megan Ambuhl Graner is prosecuted for not reporting 
acts of abuse in the fall of 2003 and is sentenced to a reduction of rank to 
private and loss of a half-month’s pay. On October 30th 2004 she pleads 
guilty and she later receives an other-than-honorable discharge from the 
army. 
Javal Davis 
Javal Davis was a Sergeant with the 372nd MP Company. He joined the Army 
Reserves in 1994 because the military life impressed him and he took pride 
in serving his country to the point where he was willing to die protecting it. 
Especially after 9/11 this resolve strengthened. 
At first he was serving at Tiers 1A and 1B where the intelligence detainees 
were kept, but got transferred to Tiers 3A and 3B of Abu Ghraib’s hard site 
where Iraqis arrested as common criminals were detained. There was no 
structure to any of the arrests of the detainees at Tiers 3A and 3B, they had 
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never been charged with anything or received a court date. This caused 
major frustration between the detainees.  
“To gain respect and burn off some energy, Davis would strip to the waist and 
work out in front of his new wards. He could do thirty pull-ups in a set, and a 
hundred push-ups, and when he was done he’d let a few prisoners out at a 
time and offer cigarettes to anyone who could do better. He didn’t have to give 
away a lot of cigarettes, but he said the prisoners appreciated it. He organized 
regular prayer hours for them, and with time, he learned passable Arabic, and 
they appreciated that, too.”60 
In this case Davis applied a very human approach in his relations to the 
Iraqis and this something-for-something, man-to-man relation seemed to 
work well for him.  
He couldn’t keep that attitude up at all times though. He had a reputation as 
a man who liked to yell at his prisoners, subject them to psychological 
strain and threats. Staff Sergeant Frederick stated that Davis sometimes 
would kidney-punch new prisoners while they were being processed. 
Even though Davis had been transferred from Tier 1A and 1B and had no 
official business there anymore, he still went back from time to time. 
Spending nights on Tier 1A meant seeing MI and OGA, ‘other government 
agencies’ (FBI, CIA, NSA etc.), people coming and going, making fun of what 
was going on. He explains it like this:  
“over time—seeing it every day, day in and day out, and then seeing the MI 
guys and some of the OGA guys coming in, laughing and joking like it’s 
funny—after a while it became the same thing for myself. Like, man, look at 
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that guy. I bet you don’t want to blow up Americans now. I bet you don’t want 
to come shoot at us now. You go from a compassionate guy, saying, ‘Hey, don’t 
put that guy in no panties, that’s a grown man, what the hell are you doing?’ 
to ‘Yeah, you’re in the panties now, brother. Don’t you feel ashamed now?’”61 
Javal Davis was part of the group of soldiers convicted for the events of 
November 7th 2003 portrayed by photographs taken by Sabrina Harman 
and others, where detainees were subjected to enhanced interrogation 
methods, and Davis for instance jumped and threw himself on to a heap of 
detainees that had been piled up on the floor. He does not deny it though, 
but explains it with this:  
“It got down to everyone was pissed. You know, soldiers got hurt—it was a 
real heated moment.’ Davis understood why the prisoners would riot. They 
were pissed off too, he said. […] ‘And a bunch of them were there for no 
reason, just because they got swept up in a raid. Like they were in a 
concentration camp, you know. […] I had a soldier die that I knew, got killed 
by an insurgent. We were getting bombed every night. All those things balling 
up into a ball in your mind, and you just want to take it out on that guy, right 
there. He wants to take your life, or wants to see you hurt, when you’re there 
to try to protect him from being hurt. […] I wanted to hurt him really bad, 
because I felt that he deserved it. I felt that they all deserved it. So I stepped on 
the guy’s finger. I stepped on the guy’s toe. At the time, of course, I was like, 
‘Wow, I think we’re crossing the line.’ But the answer to that was the contrary: 
We’re at war. They blew up New York, and anything goes.’”62 
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On March 20th 2004, Sergeant Javal Davis was prosecuted for his 
participation in the events of November 7th 2003. On February 4th 2005 he 
pleaded guilty to assault, intent to deceive on an official statement, and 
dereliction of duty. He was sentenced to 6 months in prison, a reduction in 
rank to private, and a bad conduct discharge. 
Jeremy Sivits 
Jeremy Sivits was a Specialist with the 372nd MP Company as a mechanic. 
He too was implicated in the events on November 7th 2003 and was later 
convicted for his participation. 
He describes himself as an easygoing, agreeable guy, who wants to be 
friends with everybody, and that is his explanation of how he got himself 
pulled into the activity surrounding the treatment of the detainees on Tier 
1A.  
Sivit’s only actual crime in all this mess, seem to be failure of reporting what 
he witnessed on Tier 1A. He was a mechanic so he did not deal with 
prisoners except when he offered to help out Sgt. Frederick of November 
7th. Upon delivering his detainee to Tier 1A:  
“Graner instructed them to dump the prisoners in a pile on the floor. Sivits 
gave his man a push, and he fell on top of the others.”63 
March 20th 2004 Jeremy Sivits was prosecuted for participating in the 
events of November 7th 2003. On May 19th 2004 he pleads guilty to 
dereliction of duty, maltreatment, and conspiracy to maltreat. He was 
sentenced to 1 year in military-prison, a reduction in rank to private, a fine, 
and bad-conduct discharge from the Army.  
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Geoffrey Miller 
Geoffrey Miller was in 2003, and at the time of the Abu Ghraib prison 
scandal, Major General with command of Joint Task Force Guantanamo, that 
also had its share of negative attention regarding treatment of detainees. He 
visited Abu Ghraib in August 2003  
“To discuss what he called the ‘current theater ability to rapidly exploit 
internees for actionable intelligence.’”64 
He was never charged with anything despite the fact that many had the 
comprehension that:  
“’I do believe that the Miller visit propelled Abu Ghraib to become a ‘mini-mo’,’ 
Captain Wood said.”65 
Joe Darby 
Joe Darby was, as mentioned, known as the whistleblower of Abu Ghraib. 
He returned to Abu Ghraib from home leave, and so did not partake in any 
of the highly chastised events, that would later incriminate the others. 
He explains how he got pictures from Graner: 
”But he said that as he flipped through Graner’s photos, and realized that they 
were shot on Tier 1A, he focused on the images of “sexual stuff” from the night 
of the pyramid, and it occurred to him that what he was looking at was 
evidence of prisoner abuse. And then the next thought is, ‘What do I do?’ ” he 
said. “ ‘Do I turn these in? Do I look the other way?’”66 
Joe Darby was never convicted and was actually regarded as a hero for 
exposing the pictures. 
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Chapter 3: Analysis and Discussion 
In looking at cases of the Stanford Prison Experiment and the events that 
took place at the Abu Ghraib prison in 2003, it becomes clear that there are 
some striking similarities in both the physical aspects of the environments 
and behavior of the people involved. In the aftermath of the experiment 
conducted at Stanford University by Philip Zimbardo and his associates, 
Zimbardo has developed his theory of the Bad Barrel to explain the 
behavior of the college students involved in the experiment. Because of the 
similarities between Stanford and Abu Ghraib, it is very much relevant to 
look at his theory and apply it in the context of Abu Ghraib and the behavior 
of the 372nd MP Company personnel. In order to compare and elaborate on 
the behavior of the guards at Abu Ghraib it is also relevant to look at army 
psychologist Col. Larry C. James’ explanation of what caused this abusive 
behavior. In this following analysis the three different theories will be put 
head to head and their strengths and weaknesses compared and dissected.  
Philip Zimbardo and Colonel James 
Zimbardo’s Bad Barrel theory as mentioned earlier is what Colonel James’ 
bases his own theory of the abusive behavior on. Col. James has a PhD in 
psychology and has made a career in the US Army serving several military 
hospitals. He is considered an expert in the field of prisoner psychology and 
played a big part in developing interrogation methods aimed at prisoners 
accused of committing acts of terrorism. In 2002 when reports of prisoner 
abuse at the Guantanamo base in Cuba started to surface in the media, Col. 
James was appointed by the army to sort out the situation and improve the 
conditions for both interrogators and detainees. He constructed guidelines 
for the personnel to follow and he managed to change the situation for the 
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better. In 2004, when the photos of prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib were 
leaked to the press, Col. James was again approached to fix an embarrassing 
problem for the US Army. James consulted with Zimbardo before going to 
Iraq, and the two of them discussed The Stanford Experiment and how the 
findings from Stanford could help deal with the situations at Abu Ghraib 
and perhaps help understand why it went wrong. On the several flights 
James had to take to get to Iraq, he watched video recordings of Stanford 
repeatedly and made a list with steps of action that had to be put in place, in 
order to turn the situation around. 
In September 2004 James had a conversation with a Lt. Colonel stationed at 
Abu Ghraib where they discuss the situation at hand and what caused the 
abuses that transpired almost a year before. He arrived at this conundrum: 
“Who (or perhaps what) caused Abu Ghraib to occur? Was it an intentional, 
evil plan by the Bush administration? Was it just the natural evil in normal 
human beings coming out under stress? Was it an institutional problem or the 
actions of a few bad apples?”67 
To answer these questions he developed a theory of his own that would 
explain the complexity of the situation at Abu Ghraib and at the same time 
deal with the issue of assigning personal blame which counters the points 
made by Zimbardo in his Bad Barrel theory.  James’ theory conveys the idea 
that the barrel is not the sole reason why people do evil acts. He claims that 
people have to be predisposed to letting certain immoral urges manifest 
themselves in their behavior, because of the fact that only 8 people out of 
2200 soldiers stationed at Abu Ghraib were involved in the abusive 
treatment of detainees. 
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“[…] I was also certain that the individual soldiers had some predisposition to 
this immoral behavior. I was beginning to wonder if we had taken eight 
questionable apples and thrown them in a Bad Barrel. How would the results be 
any different than what we were seeing in Abu Ghraib?”68 
Philip Zimbardo arrives at his Bad Barrel theory because the participants 
were screened thoroughly to ensure they were all perfectly ‘good apples’. 
He made a point of only recruiting healthy male college students to his 
experiment. This therefore supports the idea of the environment as the 
main catalyst in causing these ordinary students to turn to abusive 
behavior. 
Colonel James on the other hand speaks to the point that the catalyst is 
found in the people who are in the barrel. There were certain factors in 
both situations that Zimbardo and James can agree on being relevant for the 
behavior to deteriorate into abuse. One of these similarities involves the 
people put in charge of guarding other people. At Stanford, the students 
selected to be guards received little but a few general guidelines to follow, 
but had not prior to the experiment received any form of training for the 
job they were tasked. At Abu Ghraib, the MPs too had not received the 
proper training that would help them perform their duties, which consisted 
of preparing detainees for interrogation. The MPs did receive training on 
keeping law and order, and how to contain a general prison population, but 
not in the manner that was required for Abu Ghraib. 
Therein lies the difference between the two: The students at Stanford 
received no training at all while the MPs did have to go through basic 
training. At Stanford, Zimbardo in conjunction with the students, created 
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some general guidelines that the guards were to follow in order for the 
experiment and the prison to operate smoothly, these were handed out in 
writing to the students, both guards and prisoners, while the MPs at Abu 
Ghraib had to deal with very vague guidelines that were often revised by 
the higher ranking officers or the Department of Defense.  
Due to the lack of preparation for the task of being prison guards, the 
students at Stanford were left mostly to their own devices when handling 
prisoners. Early on in the experiment the guards turned to de-
individualizing the prisoners in order to be in control of the “cellblock”, 
such as by removing their personal clothing in exchange for bland and 
uniform clothes and referring to them only by their prison-numbers and 
not their actual names. 
The same process of removing any kind of personal identity was exercised 
at Abu Ghraib where the detainees were processed through the prison 
administration and henceforth only known as a number. All clothing was 
removed and the detainee was then hooded, given a standard prison 
garment to wear and placed in the correctional facility corresponding with 
the severity of their alleged crimes.  
The mentality of the MPs at Abu Ghraib toward the detainees were very 
much influenced by mortar attacks that would land somewhere on the 
compound every night, often times killing or maiming friends and 
colleagues. To the guards, the Iraqi outside the prison was no different from 
the Iraqi inside, and prisoners, guilty or not, were treated at times with 
extreme prejudice and animosity. It was common for the detainees to save 
their feces and urine in the containers they were handed when being fed, 
for the purpose of throwing them in the faces of the guards as they walked 
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by. These factors together create the mentality in the guards that is called 
“The Enemy Effect”, as Zimbardo says is the distinction between us, our kin, 
our kind and them, their kin, their kind, which is the act of mentally 
lumping a large group of people together based on ethnicity, color, creed or 
some other feature they have in common, thereby branding them all as 
enemies. 
The same effect started to become evident in Zimbardo’s experiment when 
a riot ensued in the early hours of day two. The hostility of the prisoners 
created The Enemy Effect in the guards, where, even though it was just an 
experiment, the differences of the two groups became very distinct, to a 
point where it was now “them vs. us” seen from both sides. The guards 
being the dominant group seemed to have a constant need to ascertain their 
position of power and make it clear to the prisoners who’s in charge. 
Because of the enemy effect being instilled in the mindset of the guards at 
both Abu Ghraib and Stanford, the treatment of prisoners and detainees 
evolved in brutality to the point of their behavior becoming abusive.  
This abusive behavior was made all the more easy by the dehumanization 
of the “enemy”. At Stanford, the prisoners themselves were required to 
refer to each other by their prisoner number, thus stripping them of one of 
the essential things that makes one a person. The prisoners were also 
stripped of their autonomy by constantly being told that their opinions 
didn’t matter and being told repeatedly to perform obviously redundant 
tasks. Instilling in the prisoners a sense of worthlessness and making it 
easier for the guards to consider them as non-human entities. Hoods were 
also used for this particular purpose, at Stanford they were applied to keep 
the prisoners disoriented when moving them outside the “cellblock” for 
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instance when escorting them to the bathroom. At Abu Ghraib they were 
also used when the alleged criminals were transported to the compound 
and processed through the prison administration or sometimes when 
detainees were being interrogated. 
These things combined enabled the guards to act without sympathy or 
compassion toward their “enemies”.  
“There were a few times when I had forgotten the prisoners were people, but I 
always caught myself, realized that they were people. I simply thought of 
them as ‘prisoners’ losing touch with their humanity. This happened for short 
periods of time, usually when I was giving orders to them. I am tired and 
disgusted at times, this is usually the state of my mind. Also I make an actual 
try of my will to dehumanize them in order to make it easy for me.”69 
Most of these horrible acts of abuse occurred during the night at both 
Stanford and Abu Ghraib and were committed by the night shift in charge of 
the cellblocks. At Stanford, the abuse seemed to peak during the nightshift 
hours even though the level of supervision was the same at all times. This 
might partially be due to a greater lack of tasks for the nightshift to handle 
compared to the dayshift. The night shift, in order to keep themselves busy, 
made up tasks of their own that they needed to take care of, these included 
waking the prisoners up in the middle of the night to perform “the counts”. 
This served the dual purpose of depriving the prisoners of their much-
needed sleep and to distort their sense of time.  
The Abu Ghraib night shift performed many of the same tasks as that of 
Stanford, including depriving detainees of sleep to exhaust them in 
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preparation for the military intelligence team who were to interrogate 
them. They were basically left to their own devices during the night because 
of the lack of supervision. The soldiers had a small office set up in the upper 
tiers and would often pass the time by watching movies on a laptop. The 
boredom that the guards at both Stanford and Abu Ghraib experienced 
during the night was a leading cause for why the prisoners became a source 
of entertainment.  
The conditions under which the cellblocks at Abu Ghraib were operated 
were far from ideal. For the soldiers on the compound, each day meant 
putting your life at risk. They were understaffed and not able to patrol the 
entire perimeter of the camp or even the correctional facilities, meaning 
that prison breaks were a constant nuisance, so not only did they have to 
watch out for incoming mortar shells but also the possible escapee lurking 
in the dark around every corner. They did not have the basic living 
conditions that the facilities of the green zone, or other prison camps in 
Iraq, had. The soldiers slept in old, battered prison cells or tents out in the 
open, vulnerable to attack. Their sanitary facilities were also far below the 
standards they were used to. 
All this contributed to a constant mental stress factor making the soldiers 
much more irritable, thus heightening the likelihood of them succumbing to 
their darker and more sinister impulses. Initially the conditions at Stanford 
were far less stressful and might even have been considered nice by prison 
standards, the only point of distress being the lack of access to proper toilet 
accommodations, which had initially led to the prisoner rule about 5 minute 
bathroom visits. These conditions did, however, deteriorate throughout the 
experiment and were worsened by the implementation of using the 
aforementioned toilet visits as a privilege, and not a right as was originally 
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the idea, thereby creating a largely unpleasant odor which likely 
contributed to putting the guards in a hostile mood from the get go. 
Otherwise the conditions at Stanford don’t seem to have contributed much 
to it being a Bad Barrel or at least not nearly as much as the structure of the 
system that the Stanford prison represented. A system in which people with 
no training and no discernible knowledge regarding the setting they were 
placed in and with few, and vague guidelines to follow, ended up instigating 
the abuse of others who might as well, but for the flip of a coin, have been 
their co-workers.  
Along with the issue of not having guidelines that clearly state what is 
allowed and what is prohibited, the leadership at Stanford did not properly 
supervise the guards or the wellbeing of the prisoners. Zimbardo himself 
has claimed that his dual role as the superintendent of the prison and lead 
researcher caused him to lose focus, possibly because he had a selfish 
interest as a scientist to let things play out without intervening for the 
experiment to yield the most interesting results. He has later come to the 
conclusion that he should have had separated the two and assigned the role 
of superintendent to a different person.  
One of the main points in Col. James’ theory of how to prevent things going 
awry when handling prisoners, is the fact that leadership needs to be visible 
at all times, most importantly when guards do not expect to be supervised. 
The superior officer has to be willing to look for skeletons under every rock. 
At Abu Ghraib the boss was simply never around. Janis Karpinski, who was 
in charge of the 372th MP Company that would handle the prisoners and 
was involved in the abuse, oversaw 15 detention camps spread out across 
Iraq and had never been in charge of a prison before. Being severely 
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overtasked, she could not be present at all at Abu Ghraib to ensure that the 
MP guards followed an appropriate code of conduct. Major David DiNenna 
was next in command of the MPs but was busy handling the logistics that 
make up running a prison encampment.  
James quickly turned this around when he arrived at Abu Ghraib. As a 
colonel he outranked most of the personnel present and put a lot of effort in 
to making himself visible at all hours of the day, most importantly for the 
night shift to notice that a superior officer was watching over them. Because 
the abusive behavior of Abu Ghraib was perpetrated by the night shift, this 
is where he put his focus. He found that the conditions under which the 
abuse had occurred, and the leadership situation that had allowed said 
abuses, had not improved in the slightest: 
“As I walked to the intel center, I was intensely curious to see what was really 
going on in this place, and more than a bit apprehensive. Walking past the 
sleeping soldier who was supposed to be guarding the entrance to the 
building, I entered and proceeded down the long hall. […] Inside, I found a 
twenty-five-year-old supervisor fast asleep with his feet up, a Playboy 
magazine clutched tightly to his chest. As I stood over him, I noticed he wore 
dark aviator sunglasses, despite it being 1:30 in the morning, and despite his 
being asleep. They reminded me of the sunglasses worn by the “guards” in the 
Stanford Prison Experiment. I tapped on his right shoulder to get his 
attention. […] “Son, I’m Colonel James.” […] “Well sir . . . But sir, may I ask why 
you’re here, sir? We ain’t never had no colonel here this time of the night, sir.” 
“Yes, I can see that,” I responded, with a bit of a grimace. “Well, I’m here to 
keep us safe and help make us all better.” Then I turned and went to disturb 
the nap of the sleeping MP guard at the front door.”70 
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This lack of supervision led the soldiers to falsely get the impression that 
their actions would not be penalized and since no one was putting an end to 
the behavior, it was believed to be allowed. Thus creating the effect of living 
inside a bubble where the rules and morals of the outside had no influence 
on their behavior.  The uniform clothing and somewhat similar appearance 
of the soldiers helped create in them a feeling of self-perceived anonymity. 
This anonymity of the individual guard might be what enhanced this 
“bubble effect”.  
The bubble effect might have played a role at Stanford as well but to a lesser 
degree. As before the uniform clothing and the aviator glasses made the 
guards feel more anonymous which probably increased the bubble effect 
here as well. When the guards found out that breaking the rules they 
themselves had agreed upon had no consequences, they proceeded to 
continuously break them. 
There were a few guards who chose to not participate in the abuses that 
were otherwise so prevalent among the guards, but they generally did 
nothing to hinder them either. Only one instance of such an action was 
recorded during the experiment. A guard, who was normally one of the 
most physically abusive guards, chose to break the pattern when he walked 
over to a prisoner, who was unhappy with the guards decision to let 
another prisoner sleep in the isolation closet, and told him that he was 
going to let the prisoner out of isolation and put him to bed as soon as the 
other prisoners had fallen asleep. The rest of the guards who chose not to 
participate in the abuses but who also opted not to do anything at all to 
hinder the abuses perpetrated by their fellow guards, were generally 
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considered “good” by the prisoners but were still quite guilty of the “evil of 
inaction”. 
At Abu Ghraib the amount of people directly perpetrating the abuses was 
actually a very small minority, while the vast majority did not actively 
participate in the abuses. These guards, just like the ones in Stanford, chose 
not to act upon the abuses they witnessed and just continued their routines 
thus becoming perpetrators of the exact same evil of inaction as was 
committed by the guards at Stanford. In The Stanford Experiment, however, 
there was at least one act of open opposition towards the abusive methods 
practiced at Abu Ghraib. In the prison it was commonplace to use dogs as a 
means of intimidation, letting the canines bark and growl at the prisoners 
while they were being interrogated under the threat of letting go of the 
leash if the prisoner did not cooperate. It must be noted that in Iraq, having 
a dog as a pet is not common practice, which may enhance the level of fear 
induced by the dogs.  
During one of these interrogations a woman, who was a member of a K-9 
unit, was asked to use her dog for just this purpose. She flat out denied the 
request and thus opposing the abusive tendencies that were frequently 
used in interrogations at Abu Ghraib.  
“[…] ‘Sir, she said, ‘You’re crazy. This is my dog, that’s an illegal order and you 
can’t make me do that shit. This is my dog and you ain’t gonna tell me to make 
him hurt anybody.’ […] This young MP was a K-9 dog handler during the 
abuse period from August to October 2003. One night, she was called to the 
cellblock where all the abuses commonly occurred and was ordered to have 
her dog be used in the torture tactics. She refused, […] Then she calmly told 
her dog, “Let’s go,” and walked off the cellblock, never looking back.”71 
                                                          
71
 Col. James, L C & Freeman, G A “Fixing Hell” Ch. 9 P. 190 L. 20 – P. 191 L. 2 
71 
 
Defusing the Bad Barrel 
Though Col. James gives a more nuanced view of Dr. Zimbardo’s Bad Barrel 
theory, they can both agree on the most significant points, these being 
conditions, lack of supervision and guidelines. However, Professors 
Alexander Haslam and Stephen D. Reicher do not agree. In their essay 
published in the open access journal plosbiology.org on November 20th 
2012, they challenge the idea of the environment being the primary 
contributor to moral decay.  
They question the very validity of Zimbardo’s experiment, because of the 
predetermined elements, such as lack of ethnic diversity among the 
participants and the active role Zimbardo played in determining the 
behavior of the prison guards. The thesis Haslam and Reicher has created 
based on the Stanford Prison Experiment is that, rather than having evil 
imposed on them by the situation and surroundings they are placed in, they 
choose actively to perform evil acts.  
They came to this conclusion by viewing footage from the Stanford Prison 
Experiment, and observing how the prison guards were committed and 
creative in their abuse of the prisoners. This meaning inventing new forms 
of counts where the prisoners would for e.g. sing their prisoner ID-
numbers, making new forms of punishments and even rewrite the rules 
that they themselves had agreed upon prior to the experiment, to give them 
a more malignant streak. This all point towards a conscious choice in the 
minds of the guards and not, as Zimbardo concludes mindless conformity to 
a broken system. Instead they introduce the idea that, when believing in a 
cause, you would go through great lengths to serve and protect it. 
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Believing in a greater good can be related to the Abu Ghraib Prison scandal, 
where the prison guards were fighting the war against terror. They were 
witnesses to the murder of their friends and fellow countrymen and the 
mental scars of the events of September 11th 2001 were still fresh in their 
memory. 
In the Stanford Prison Experiment, however, this concept came into play as 
they believed they contributed to an experiment that would have great 
impact on the understanding of the human psyche.  
In the 1960’s, Dr. Stanley Milgram conducted an experiment that would 
explore the human tendency to obey commands when in the presence of a 
direct authority figure. He set up a fake situation wherein he had an 
unknowing participant (teacher) sit in a room and supposedly administer 
electric jolts to a person (learner) in the booth next to him. When the 
learner gave a wrong answer on a quiz, shocks were administered to see if 
this would improve his learning ability. The person supposed to receive the 
electric shock however, was an actor, and was never at any point during the 
experiment exposed to pain. A prime part of the motivational influence was 
the presence of an authority figure, a man dressed in a lab-coat who was 
described as the head researcher on the project. One of the main points of 
the experiment was to observe how people reacted to authority. They 
arrived at the conclusion that people would go through great lengths when 
urged by an authority-figure. However, Haslam and Reicher dispute this 
result. They arrive at a different conclusion when looking at the same data. 
Their take on the experiment is that people were more likely to continue 
causing pain, when being told that the experiment requires, that they 
continue instead of being given a direct order like “you have no other 
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choice, you must go on!”72, where most of the participating people would 
refuse. 
This is particularly relevant in the case of Abu Ghraib. The Abu Ghraib 
Prison was an instrument in a time of war. The prison guards believed they 
were fighting for a greater good and they were under the impression that 
the lives of their fellow Americans depended on them getting intelligence, 
no matter the cost. This feeling is something the army makes a great deal of 
trying to implement in the minds of soldiers. The following quote is from 
the official website of the US Army:  
“[…] As a Soldier, you will be prepared to serve our country whenever and 
wherever you are needed, combat-ready at all times, trained to counter any 
threat, anywhere.”73 
This concept of a greater good constitutes the utmost justification for 
people e.g. soldiers, to go against their own moral code and commit acts 
they would normally find atrocious.  
In the case of Milgram, the professors make the point that abuse was 
tolerated in the name of scientific progress, being told that your effort made 
a difference in the outcome between failure and success. Military 
Intelligence officers would often thank Corporal Graner for the work that 
was being done on Tier 1A, how it had softened the detainees to a point 
where they were ready to crack and confess to their crimes. 
In other words the soldiers submit to the idea that something, or someone, 
is worth throwing away your previous inclinations for. They accept the 
rules of their new environment, even though this might contradict their 
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own sense of moral, and they can eventually loose grasp of where their own 
morals stop and the new ones begin. In relation to the Milgram Experiment, 
the authority figure in military context is a higher ranked soldier.   
“The MI staffs to my understanding have been giving Granier compliments on 
the way he has been handling the MI holds. Example being statements like, 
‘Good job, they’re breaking down real fast. They answer every question. 
They’re giving out good information, Finally, and Keep up the good work . 
Stuff like that’.”74 
In the case of Abu Ghraib, Corporal Graner became a figure of authority. 
Due to the lack of visible command he was one of the highest ranking 
officers present on Tier 1A. Even though Staff Sergeant Frederick was also 
one of the orchestrators in the abuse scandal of Abu Ghraib and technically 
outranks Graner, it is Graner who stands as the main instigator to most of 
the episodes where abuse occurred. This may be explained by his 
charismatic appearance. Specialist Joe Darby says of Graner: 
“He is the most charismatic, most manipulative person you will meet,” Darby 
said. “You want to like him when you talk to him. But he has a very dark side, 
a very, very dark side.”75 
It is a person with characteristics exactly like these, according to Reicher 
and Haslam, which makes a leader of the sort who can turn others into 
simple followers and thereby get them to accept a different set of moral 
guidelines.  
Haslam and Reicher stress the point that personal histories between people 
of a group strengthen the feeling of a collective group identity. Major 
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General Taguba, who writes in his report that the personal relationships 
between the MP guards at Abu Ghraib had a major role to play, also 
supports this.  
Many of them knew each other prior to being deployed in Iraq, and this has 
most likely affected them to the point of taking part in the behavior of a 
group of friends and colleagues, rather than taking a step back to judge 
what they were doing on a moral basis.  
Because the soldiers on Tier 1A of Abu Ghraib shared “the same boat” they 
came to identify with each other and so letting the stronger, more 
influential personality shape their common behavioral pattern. This creates 
an environment where the other guards weigh their actions against those of 
Graner, and let his immoral dispositions be the ethical guide by which they 
are greatly influenced. 
“Darby saw Frederick and England and Harman and Jeremy Sivits, too, in the 
pictures, but he was fixated on Graner. To Darby, it was obvious that Graner 
was the source of the abuse, and that the others, while culpable as well, were 
simply under his sway.”76 
Not until Joe Darby came in possession of the evidence of abuse that 
happened on Tier 1A of the hard site did it have consequences for the 
people involved. Many people witnessed the horrific scenes of abuse; some 
even found them disturbing, but nonetheless remained passive in the act of 
stopping it. Haslam and Reicher extract from the Stanford Prison 
Experiment, among other things, that the collective identity of a group and 
followership caused many of the guards to partake in the abusive treatment 
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of prisoners. All of the participating guards in Zimbardo’s experiment were 
young Caucasian males and two guards in particular, from different shifts, 
were seen as the ringleaders.  The act of identifying with these two people, 
capable of vicious behavior, is based on several elements. One of them being 
social background and the perception of physical similarity, such as white 
males from California, but also the mere fact of being assigned to a group 
that has a predetermined role to play, in both these cases guarding 
prisoners, will conform the members to perform the tasks of the group.  
Conclusion 
When listening to the various parts of the scientific community you quickly 
get the feeling that Zimbardo, through his famous Stanford Prison 
Experiment, has come to shape the foundation of how most of us view evil 
and the surfacing of malignant behavior. However when one looks closely at 
the events of the Stanford Prison Experiment and when one tries to use 
Zimbardo’s theory outside the setting that spawned it, for instance the 
abuses at Abu Ghraib, it quickly becomes apparent that it might not be as 
wholesome and all-encompassing as it seems. While being a somewhat 
solid theory, when held up to Abu Ghraib there are some inconsistencies, 
such as the fact that not all of the guards at Abu Ghraib were involved in the 
abuses. This all seems to point towards the possibility of Zimbardo’s theory 
being overly simplistic in nature and that there might be other aspects that 
help contribute to moral decay, than the proverbial Bad Barrel. It also quickly 
becomes clear that, while the Bad Barrel theory may be prevalent, it is by no 
means the only theory out there that deals with this part of the human 
condition. Haslam and Reicher speak for one of these theories, a theory that 
points towards evil as a conscious choice and not as an environmentally 
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induced reflex. In their theory they also state that for people to conform to 
the evil of a situation there need to be some factors that the people involved 
have in common, such as race, color and creed or, in the case of Abu Ghraib, 
the general ideology they try to preserve and a distinct feeling of serving a 
greater good. 
In conclusion it can be said that, when looking at the different theories 
processed during the course of the project work, it does seem like the 
theory of Haslam and Reicher is more well supported by the available data, 
than the other theories included in our work, and also offers us a new and 
more nuanced view of the events at both Stanford and Abu Ghraib. The 
theory based on multiple factors, which includes the personal, preconceived 
inclinations of the guards and the environment fits neatly with the events at 
Abu Ghraib and also goes well in hand with Dr. Harry Nelson who says that 
predisposition and opportunity equals criminal behavior.77 
Critique 
 
Source material 
Although Zimbardo is a genuine first-hand witness to the Stanford Prison 
Experiment, we have to question our source material in that the only 
version of the events that transpired during the experiment is the one 
published by him.  
Zimbardo seems to have predilection for writing dramatically. The 
tendency towards turning observations into an almost novel-like narrative 
is clearly visible and, although it arguably enriches the text and makes it 
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more enticing to read, than if it had been a cut and dry retelling of the 
events. This has the added effect of allowing one to doubt the sincerity of 
the author and whether this is fact or fiction. An example of the dramatic 
and narrative style can be seen here: 
“Community spirit thrives in a quiet, orderly way in places such as Palo Alto 
where people care about the physical and social quality of their lives and have 
the resources to work at improving both. Here there is a sense of fairness and 
trust that contrasts with the nagging tugs of inequity and cynicism that drag 
down folks in some other places.”78 
During the second chapter of The Lucifer Effect we are informed that he has 
taken artistic liberties when writing this particular chapter and he has built 
this narrative on a foundation of different sources but, at the same time, 
fails to identify these sources. This seems conspicuous given the level of 
attention to detail every other source in the book has received. During this 
particular part of the text Zimbardo describes events and actions he has no 
possibility of verifying. At times he even places himself inside the minds of 
some of the people described during the chapter. This may be to enhance 
the story and make it more exciting to read, but also opens the possibility of 
coloring the reader’s opinion on the different characters before the story 
really begins. An example of this can be seen here: 
“’Please ask your father to see to it.’ Mrs. Whittlow was involved in examining 
her conscience because she had many misgivings about the changes that had 
been taking place in the church services from which she had just returned. She 
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had also been thinking a lot about Hubbie recently, preparing herself for a life 
of twice-a-year visits from her beautiful fuzzy-blond, blue-eyed charmer.”79 
Another problem with our source material is that it all seems connected to 
Zimbardo and the fact that he is credited in every source we have that deals 
with the Stanford Prison Experiment. This may leave us with a biased telling 
of the experiment and may have colored our minds before we got to the 
writing phase of the project. 
We have used a website for background information on Abu Ghraib called 
Globalsecurity.org. The site is maintained by John E. Pike. He is a member of 
the Council on Foreign Relations and regularly appears on news programs, 
on all the major networks, as an expert commentator on security issues. 
Through this we have assessed that the information on this website is 
legitimate.       
The book Standard Operating Procedure is an extended version of the 
documentary film of the same title, both written by Errol Morris. The book 
is co-authored by Philip Gourevitch. Morris is a documentary filmmaker 
and it is possible that his love of drama and film has colored the way in 
which the events are portrayed in both the film and the book, for instance 
using reconstructions of the events in Abu Ghraib as dramatic effect. 
In addition to Standard Operating Procedure, Errol Morris has also directed 
the documentaries The Fog of War: 11 lessons from the life of Robert S. 
McNamara and The Thin Blue Line which all takes a critical look at different 
areas of government, in smaller or larger scales. His films aim to raise 
questions concerning how the systems of American governance function 
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and try to point out their flaws. In Standard Operating Procedure he 
interviews the guards involved in the abuse and uses them and their stories 
to criticize the chain of command and those responsible for Abu Ghraib.  
A possible problem of having first-hand accounts told by the people 
involved, is that it opens up the possibility of them minimizing the severity 
of their actions. We see examples of this in the interviews, where one 
person tells the story of his or hers fellow guard. The following quote is 
Megan Ambuhl Graner on her husband Charles Graner.  
 “He didn’t want to see this guy [Prisoner nicknamed Santa] who was mental 
be harassed by other detainees. Same with Shitboy – we weren’t interested in 
seeing these people suffer.”80 
We have made use of another book called Fixing Hell. The author is the 
retired colonel and army psychologist, Larry C. James.  He considers himself 
a conservative Democrat, but still a strong supporter in the invasion of Iraq. 
The fact that he is also an army colonel, may have colored his account of 
events in the book, specifically about the leadership and the chain of 
command. One could think that he omitted certain critiques he might have 
had, to protect his superiors. In addition to being in the army he has sworn 
an oath as a physician to dedicate his life to the service of humanity. This 
means that he has the interest and wellbeing of the detainees at heart first 
and foremost. This poses a paradox. Though he might wish to spare the 
people who in this case made the mistake, he might also want to assign 
blame. The complexity of his situation is something he is aware of though, 
and throughout the book he frequently considers this issue. 
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Both Fixing Hell and Standard Operating Procedure, focuses on the lack of 
leadership and the poor living conditions as one of the reasons for 
attributing to an environment where abuse could happen. They cannot, 
however, agree on the role that General Miller had to play in the events of 
Abu Ghraib. In “Standard Operating Procedure” he is portrayed as an 
unsympathetic leader who is well aware of the conditions of the detainees 
but cannot be bothered.: 
“The first thing I noticed is that you’re treating the prisoners too well. You 
have to have control, and they have to know that you’re in control. You have 
to treat the prisoners like dogs.” 81 
However, in Fixing Hell Col. James portrays him as the soldier who has a 
sincere wish to fix what went wrong, and he goes through great strides to 
make sure that Col. James gets everything he asks for.  
“From the first meeting I had with General Miller after arriving, he 
emphasized that he was behind me. […] He also stressed that he expected me 
to come up with the solutions that would set Abu Ghraib right. He made it 
clear to the leadership on post that I had open access to anything I needed to 
accomplish the mission“82 
This shows that the two books sheds light on two separate sides of the same 
coin, and gives us a possibility to create a nuanced point of view and not 
rely solely on one account of the events at Abu Ghraib.  
One thing to be aware of when reading Col. James’ Fixing Hell is that as one 
of the first things he notes is that he has changed names and identifying 
characteristics. This can prove a hindrance in working with the material, as 
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comparisons to other literature becomes significantly more difficult, 
thereby making it problematic to reaffirm facts. In our use of this material, 
however, it is not names and personality traits we have relied on and the 
alterations should therefore not have a big influence on the quality of our 
report. 
In the essay, Contesting the “Nature” of Conformity, the professors S. 
Alexander Haslam and Stephen D. Reicher rethink the results and 
conclusions of the experiments by Milgram and Zimbardo and form their 
own.  It has been hard to find points to critique, either because of our 
limited experience within the field or because their essay is very well 
founded in good logical reasoning and therefore has no obvious fallacies. 
Summary 
I kapitel 1 forklares der om Dr. Philip Zimbardos Stanford Prison 
Experiment. Der vil være en udredning for hver af de seks dage 
eksperimentet varede og en redegørelse for den teori Dr. Zimbardo udledte 
deraf. 
Kapitel 2 indeholder en beskrivelse af Abu Ghraib-fængslet og en 
fremstilling af de vigtigste af de personer, der var involverede i 
mishandlingen af de indsatte. Her vil også være en gennemgang af et udvalg 
af de billeder, der blev lækket til pressen i 2004 og som gjorde at 
situationen i Irak blev offentlig kendt. 
I kapitel 3 sammenlignes sagerne om Stanford Prison Experiment og 
skandalen fra Abu Ghraib. Der gives en redegørelse for forskelle og 
ligheder, og til sidst en sammenligning og en diskussion af Zimbardos teori 
om the Bad Barrel og teorien doktorerne Haslam og Reicher fremstiller i 
deres essay Contesting the ”Nature” of Conformity . 
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Til slut konkluderes at den teori Dr. Zimbardo har udformet, som går ud på 
at det omgivende miljø og de omstændigheder man befinder sig i er 
hovedårsagen til moralsk fordærv, ikke er fuldt ud i stand til at forklare 
hvorfor folk adopterer en ondskabsfuld adfærd og at der er andre faktorer, 
der spiller ind når et menneske bliver ondt. 
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Annex 1 – List of Participants 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Guards Prisoners 
Day Shift: 10 A.M. – 6 P.M. Cell#1 
Arnett, Markus, Landry 
(John) 
3401 - Glenn 
Night Shift: 6 P.M. – 2 A.M. 5704 – Paul 
Hellmann, Burdan, Landry 
(Geoff) 
7258 – Hubbie 
Morning Shift: 2 A.M. – 10 
A.M. 
Cell#2 
Vandry, Ceros, Varnish 819 – Stewart 
Back-up Guards 1037 – Rich 
Morismo, Peters 8612 – Doug 
 Cell#3 
 2093 – Tom “Sarge” 
 3425 – Jim 
 5486 - Jerry 
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Annex 2 - Pictures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Picture 1. – October 18th, 2003 
Picture 2. – October 24th, 2003 
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Picture 3. - October 25th, 2003: 
Picture 4. – November 4th and 5th, 2003 
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Picture 5. – November 7th, 2003 
Picture 6. – November 7th, 2003 
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Picture 7. – December 12th, 2003 
